capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap (fc7eadf7) · Commits · 戴 / test

security/commoncap.c

+10 −10

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry dentry, void *ivalue, size_t size)
		static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
		struct linux_binprm *bprm,
		bool *effective,
		bool *has_cap)
		bool *has_fcap)
		{
		struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
		unsigned i;
		@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
		*effective = true;

		if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
		*has_cap = true;
		*has_fcap = true;

		CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
		__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
		@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
		* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
		* constructed by execve().
		*/
		static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm bprm, bool effective, bool *has_cap)
		static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm bprm, bool effective, bool *has_fcap)
		{
		int rc = 0;
		struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
		@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm bprm, bool effective, bool *has_c
		goto out;
		}

		rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
		rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
		if (rc == -EINVAL)
		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
		__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
		@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ out:
		* set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
		* updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
		*/
		static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
		static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
		bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
		{
		const struct cred *old = current_cred();
		@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
		* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
		* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
		*/
		if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
		if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
		warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
		return;
		}
		@@ -759,20 +759,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
		{
		const struct cred *old = current_cred();
		struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
		bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
		bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
		int ret;
		kuid_t root_uid;

		if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
		return -EPERM;

		ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
		ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
		if (ret < 0)
		return ret;

		root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);

		handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
		handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);

		/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
		if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
		@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
		new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;

		/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
		if (has_cap \|\| is_setid)
		if (has_fcap \|\| is_setid)
		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);

		/*

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