Commit 4c7e715f authored by Richard Guy Briggs's avatar Richard Guy Briggs Committed by James Morris
Browse files

capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status



Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.

Signed-off-by: default avatarRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
parent db1a8922
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+11 −7
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -741,6 +741,12 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
		*effective = true;
}

#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
	!cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
	!cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
	cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
/**
 * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
 * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -769,10 +775,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);

	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
	if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;


	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
	 *
@@ -780,8 +785,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
	 */
	is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);

	if ((is_setid ||
	     !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
	if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
	    ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
		/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -831,8 +835,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
	 * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
	 * that is interesting information to audit.
	 */
	if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
		if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
	if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
		if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
		    !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
		    issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
			ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
@@ -852,7 +856,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
		bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
	} else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
		if (effective ||
		    !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient))
		    __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
			bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
	}