capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root

	return rc;

}

/**

 * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().

/*

 * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root

 * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds

 * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?

 * @effective: Do we have effective root privilege?

 * @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace

 *

 * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being

 * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,

 * which won't take effect immediately.  Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.

 * Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by

 * SECURE_NOROOT.  If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with

 * set UID root and nothing is changed.  If we are root, cap_permitted is

 * updated.  If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.

 */

int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,

				   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)

{

	const struct cred *old = current_cred();

	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;

	bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid;

	int ret;

	kuid_t root_uid;

	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))

		return -EPERM;

	effective = false;

	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);

	if (ret < 0)

		return ret;

	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);

	if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {

	if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))

		return;

	/*

	 * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs

	 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it

	 */

	if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {

		warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);

			goto skip;

		return;

	}

	/*

	 * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root

	 * executables under compatibility mode, we override the

	 * capability sets for the file.

		 *

		 * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.

	 */

	if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {

		/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */

		new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,

						 old->cap_inheritable);

	}

	/*

	 * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.

	 */

	if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))

			effective = true;

		*effective = true;

}

skip:

/**

 * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().

 * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds

 *

 * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being

 * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,

 * which won't take effect immediately.  Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.

 */

int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

{

	const struct cred *old = current_cred();

	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;

	bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;

	int ret;

	kuid_t root_uid;

	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))

		return -EPERM;

	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);

	if (ret < 0)

		return ret;

	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);

	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);

	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */

	if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))