Commit e4587ea1 authored by David S. Miller's avatar David S. Miller
Browse files

Merge branch 'macsec-fixes' 



Sabrina Dubroca says:

====================
macsec fixes

Patch 1 adds rcu_barrier() during module unload to prevent possible
panics.

Patch 2 allocates memory for scattergather lists and the IV on the
heap, since they can escape the current function's context during
crypto callbacks.

Patch 3 fixes a failure to create secure associations.
====================

Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parents 0ee13627 6052f7fb

drivers/net/macsec.c

+39 −10
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -605,12 +605,41 @@ static void macsec_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) 
	dev_put(dev);

}



static struct aead_request *macsec_alloc_req(struct crypto_aead *tfm,

					     unsigned char **iv,

					     struct scatterlist **sg)

{

	size_t size, iv_offset, sg_offset;

	struct aead_request *req;

	void *tmp;



	size = sizeof(struct aead_request) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);

	iv_offset = size;

	size += GCM_AES_IV_LEN;



	size = ALIGN(size, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));

	sg_offset = size;

	size += sizeof(struct scatterlist) * (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1);



	tmp = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);

	if (!tmp)

		return NULL;



	*iv = (unsigned char *)(tmp + iv_offset);

	*sg = (struct scatterlist *)(tmp + sg_offset);

	req = tmp;



	aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);



	return req;

}



static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,

				      struct net_device *dev)

{

	int ret;

	struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1];

	unsigned char iv[GCM_AES_IV_LEN];

	struct scatterlist *sg;

	unsigned char *iv;

	struct ethhdr *eth;

	struct macsec_eth_header *hh;

	size_t unprotected_len;
@@ -668,8 +697,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, 
	macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn);

	macsec_set_shortlen(hh, unprotected_len - 2 * ETH_ALEN);



	macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);



	skb_put(skb, secy->icv_len);



	if (skb->len - ETH_HLEN > macsec_priv(dev)->real_dev->mtu) {
@@ -684,13 +711,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, 
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

	}



	req = aead_request_alloc(tx_sa->key.tfm, GFP_ATOMIC);

	req = macsec_alloc_req(tx_sa->key.tfm, &iv, &sg);

	if (!req) {

		macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa);

		kfree_skb(skb);

		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

	}



	macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);



	sg_init_table(sg, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1);

	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
@@ -861,7 +890,6 @@ static void macsec_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) 
out:

	macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa);

	dev_put(dev);

	return;

}



static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -871,8 +899,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, 
				      struct macsec_secy *secy)

{

	int ret;

	struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1];

	unsigned char iv[GCM_AES_IV_LEN];

	struct scatterlist *sg;

	unsigned char *iv;

	struct aead_request *req;

	struct macsec_eth_header *hdr;

	u16 icv_len = secy->icv_len;
@@ -882,7 +910,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, 
	if (!skb)

		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);



	req = aead_request_alloc(rx_sa->key.tfm, GFP_ATOMIC);

	req = macsec_alloc_req(rx_sa->key.tfm, &iv, &sg);

	if (!req) {

		kfree_skb(skb);

		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -1234,7 +1262,7 @@ static struct crypto_aead *macsec_alloc_tfm(char *key, int key_len, int icv_len) 
	struct crypto_aead *tfm;

	int ret;



	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);

	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);

	if (!tfm || IS_ERR(tfm))

		return NULL;
@@ -3361,6 +3389,7 @@ static void __exit macsec_exit(void) 
	genl_unregister_family(&macsec_fam);

	rtnl_link_unregister(&macsec_link_ops);

	unregister_netdevice_notifier(&macsec_notifier);

	rcu_barrier();

}



module_init(macsec_init);

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