Commit 99e3a236 authored by Magnus Karlsson's avatar Magnus Karlsson Committed by Daniel Borkmann
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xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom size



Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available
space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the
headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP
headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported
size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds
write.

Fixes: c0c77d8f ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: default avatarBui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMagnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207225
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1586849715-23490-1-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@intel.com
parent 89f33dca
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+2 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr)
	u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom;
	unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page;
	u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len;
	int size_chk, err;
	int err;

	if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
		/* Strictly speaking we could support this, if:
@@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr)
			return -EINVAL;
	}

	size_chk = chunk_size - headroom - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM;
	if (size_chk < 0)
	if (headroom >= chunk_size - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM)
		return -EINVAL;

	umem->address = (unsigned long)addr;