Commit 2d6c2521 authored by Roberto Sassu's avatar Roberto Sassu Committed by Jarkko Sakkinen
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KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated



Commit c7871920 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a
TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even if a TPM is not found, to
avoid module dependency problems.

However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is
inactive or deactivated. tpm_get_random() returns an error.

This patch removes the call to tpm_get_random() and instead extends the PCR
specified by the user with zeros. The security of this alternative is
equivalent to the previous one, as either option prevents with a PCR update
unsealing and misuse of sealed data by a user space process.

Even if a PCR is extended with zeros, instead of random data, it is still
computationally infeasible to find a value as input for a new PCR extend
operation, to obtain again the PCR value that would allow unsealing.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 24073043 ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
Signed-off-by: default avatarRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
parent d45331b0
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Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1228,24 +1228,11 @@ hashalg_fail:

static int __init init_digests(void)
{
	u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
	int ret;
	int i;

	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
	if (ret < 0)
		return ret;
	if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE)
		return -EFAULT;

	digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
			  GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!digests)
		return -ENOMEM;

	for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
		memcpy(digests[i].digest, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);

	return 0;
}