KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM (c7871920) · Commits · 戴 / test

security/keys/trusted.c

+23 −5

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char digest, const unsigned char key,
		int ret;
		va_list argp;

		if (!chip)
		return -ENODEV;

		sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
		if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
		pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
		@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
		va_list argp;
		int ret;

		if (!chip)
		return -ENODEV;

		bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
		tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
		ordinal = command;
		@@ -363,6 +369,9 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
		{
		int rc;

		if (!chip)
		return -ENODEV;

		dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
		rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
		dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
		@@ -429,6 +438,9 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf tb, uint32_t handle, unsigned char *nonce)
		{
		int ret;

		if (!chip)
		return -ENODEV;

		INIT_BUF(tb);
		store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
		store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
		@@ -1245,9 +1257,13 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
		{
		int ret;

		/* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
		* TPM is not used.
		*/
		chip = tpm_default_chip();
		if (!chip)
		return -ENOENT;
		return 0;

		ret = init_digests();
		if (ret < 0)
		goto err_put;
		@@ -1269,11 +1285,13 @@ err_put:

		static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
		{
		if (chip) {
		put_device(&chip->dev);
		kfree(digests);
		trusted_shash_release();
		unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
		}
		}

		late_initcall(init_trusted);
		module_exit(cleanup_trusted);