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In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the
entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread
stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and
!CONFIG_VMAP_STACK.
cache object allocation:
kernel/fork.c:
alloc_thread_stack_node(...):
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...)
dup_task_struct(...):
...
stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...)
...
tsk->stack = stack;
copy_process(...):
...
dup_task_struct(...)
_do_fork(...):
...
copy_process(...)
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by:
David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by:
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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