Commit f1c6366e authored by Tom Lendacky's avatar Tom Lendacky Committed by Paolo Bonzini
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KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES 



When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the
guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where
certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g.
RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept
update support at various points within the KVM code.

Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the
GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error,
update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests.

Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
parent f9a4d621

arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h

+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -178,7 +178,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area { 
#define LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK BIT_ULL(0)

#define VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK BIT_ULL(1)



#define SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK 1

#define SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK	BIT_ULL(0)

#define SVM_GUEST_INTERRUPT_MASK	BIT_ULL(1)



#define SVM_IOIO_STR_SHIFT 2

#define SVM_IOIO_REP_SHIFT 3

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

+73 −10
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ 
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>

#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>

#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>

#include <asm/traps.h>



#include <asm/virtext.h>

#include "trace.h"
@@ -339,6 +340,13 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) 
{

	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);



	/*

	 * SEV-ES does not expose the next RIP. The RIP update is controlled by

	 * the type of exit and the #VC handler in the guest.

	 */

	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))

		goto done;



	if (nrips && svm->vmcb->control.next_rip != 0) {

		WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS));

		svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
@@ -350,6 +358,8 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) 
	} else {

		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->next_rip);

	}



done:

	svm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);



	return 1;
@@ -1651,9 +1661,18 @@ static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt) 


static void update_cr0_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)

{

	ulong gcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.cr0;

	u64 *hcr0 = &svm->vmcb->save.cr0;

	ulong gcr0;

	u64 *hcr0;



	/*

	 * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR

	 * tracking is done using the CR write traps.

	 */

	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))

		return;



	gcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.cr0;

	hcr0 = &svm->vmcb->save.cr0;

	*hcr0 = (*hcr0 & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK)

		| (gcr0 & SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK);
@@ -1673,7 +1692,7 @@ void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0) 
	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);



#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64

	if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {

	if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME && !vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) {

		if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {

			vcpu->arch.efer |= EFER_LMA;

			svm->vmcb->save.efer |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
@@ -2583,6 +2602,20 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) 
	return 0;

}



static int svm_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)

{

	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

	if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) || !err)

		return kvm_complete_insn_gp(&svm->vcpu, err);



	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->ghcb, 1);

	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->ghcb,

				X86_TRAP_GP |

				SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |

				SVM_EVTINJ_VALID);

	return 1;

}



static int rdmsr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)

{

	return kvm_emulate_rdmsr(&svm->vcpu);
@@ -2801,7 +2834,14 @@ static int interrupt_window_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm) 
static int pause_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)

{

	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;

	bool in_kernel = (svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 0);

	bool in_kernel;



	/*

	 * CPL is not made available for an SEV-ES guest, therefore

	 * vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel can never be true.  Just

	 * set in_kernel to false as well.

	 */

	in_kernel = !sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) && svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 0;



	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))

		grow_ple_window(vcpu);
@@ -3064,10 +3104,13 @@ static int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) 


	trace_kvm_exit(exit_code, vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);



	/* SEV-ES guests must use the CR write traps to track CR registers. */

	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {

		if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE))

			vcpu->arch.cr0 = svm->vmcb->save.cr0;

		if (npt_enabled)

			vcpu->arch.cr3 = svm->vmcb->save.cr3;

	}



	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {

		int vmexit;
@@ -3179,6 +3222,13 @@ static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr) 
{

	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);



	/*

	 * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR

	 * tracking is done using the CR write traps.

	 */

	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))

		return;



	if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))

		return;
@@ -3250,7 +3300,14 @@ bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) 
	if (!gif_set(svm))

		return true;



	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {

	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {

		/*

		 * SEV-ES guests to not expose RFLAGS. Use the VMCB interrupt mask

		 * bit to determine the state of the IF flag.

		 */

		if (!(vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_GUEST_INTERRUPT_MASK))

			return true;

	} else if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {

		/* As long as interrupts are being delivered...  */

		if ((svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)

		    ? !(svm->nested.hsave->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
@@ -3432,6 +3489,12 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) 
		svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = true;

		break;

	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:

		/*

		 * Never re-inject a #VC exception.

		 */

		if (vector == X86_TRAP_VC)

			break;



		/*

		 * In case of software exceptions, do not reinject the vector,

		 * but re-execute the instruction instead. Rewind RIP first
@@ -4306,7 +4369,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { 
	.apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,



	.msr_filter_changed = svm_msr_filter_changed,

	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,

	.complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,

};



static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c

+9 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -4006,7 +4006,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) 
{

	int idx;



	if (vcpu->preempted)

	if (vcpu->preempted && !vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)

		vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel = !kvm_x86_ops.get_cpl(vcpu);



	/*
@@ -8149,7 +8149,14 @@ static void post_kvm_run_save(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) 
{

	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;



	kvm_run->if_flag = (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) != 0;

	/*

	 * if_flag is obsolete and useless, so do not bother

	 * setting it for SEV-ES guests.  Userspace can just

	 * use kvm_run->ready_for_interrupt_injection.

	 */

	kvm_run->if_flag = !vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected

		&& (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) != 0;



	kvm_run->flags = is_smm(vcpu) ? KVM_RUN_X86_SMM : 0;

	kvm_run->cr8 = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);

	kvm_run->apic_base = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);

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