Commit ef82bcfa authored by Xin Long's avatar Xin Long Committed by David S. Miller
Browse files

sctp: use memdup_user instead of vmemdup_user



In sctp_setsockopt_bindx()/__sctp_setsockopt_connectx(), it allocates
memory with addrs_size which is passed from userspace. We used flag
GFP_USER to put some more restrictions on it in Commit cacc0621
("sctp: use GFP_USER for user-controlled kmalloc").

However, since Commit c981f254 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather
than badly open-coding memdup_user()"), vmemdup_user() has been used,
which doesn't check GFP_USER flag when goes to vmalloc_*(). So when
addrs_size is a huge value, it could exhaust memory and even trigger
oom killer.

This patch is to use memdup_user() instead, in which GFP_USER would
work to limit the memory allocation with a huge addrs_size.

Note we can't fix it by limiting 'addrs_size', as there's no demand
for it from RFC.

Reported-by: default avatar <syzbot+ec1b7575afef85a0e5ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: c981f254 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather than badly open-coding memdup_user()")
Signed-off-by: default avatarXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 1c87e79a
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
+6 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk,
	if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0))
		return -EINVAL;

	kaddrs = vmemdup_user(addrs, addrs_size);
	kaddrs = memdup_user(addrs, addrs_size);
	if (unlikely(IS_ERR(kaddrs)))
		return PTR_ERR(kaddrs);

@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk,
	addr_buf = kaddrs;
	while (walk_size < addrs_size) {
		if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrs_size) {
			kvfree(kaddrs);
			kfree(kaddrs);
			return -EINVAL;
		}

@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk,
		 * causes the address buffer to overflow return EINVAL.
		 */
		if (!af || (walk_size + af->sockaddr_len) > addrs_size) {
			kvfree(kaddrs);
			kfree(kaddrs);
			return -EINVAL;
		}
		addrcnt++;
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk,
	}

out:
	kvfree(kaddrs);
	kfree(kaddrs);

	return err;
}
@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
	if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0))
		return -EINVAL;

	kaddrs = vmemdup_user(addrs, addrs_size);
	kaddrs = memdup_user(addrs, addrs_size);
	if (unlikely(IS_ERR(kaddrs)))
		return PTR_ERR(kaddrs);

@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
	err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, flags, assoc_id);

out_free:
	kvfree(kaddrs);
	kfree(kaddrs);

	return err;
}