Commit ed49e839 authored by Takashi Iwai's avatar Takashi Iwai
Browse files

Merge tag 'asoc-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-next 

ASoC: Updates for v4.21

Not much work on the core this time around but we've seen quite a bit of
driver work, including on the generic DT drivers.  There's also a large
part of the diff from a merge of the DaVinci and OMAP directories, along
with some active development there:

 - Preparatory work from Morimoto-san for merging the audio-graph and
   audio-graph-scu cards.
 - A merge of the TI OMAP and DaVinci directories, the OMAP product line
   has been merged into the DaVinci product line so there is now a lot
   of IP sharing which meant that the split directories just got in the
   way.  This has pulled in a few architecture changes as well.
 - A big cleanup of the Maxim MAX9867 driver from Ladislav Michl.
 - Support for Asahi Kaesi AKM4118, AMD ACP3x, Intel platforms with
   RT5660, Meson AXG S/PDIF inputs, several Qualcomm IPs and Xilinx I2S
   controllers.
parents 40906ebe a7a850db

CREDITS

+12 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2204,6 +2204,10 @@ S: Post Office Box 371 
S: North Little Rock, Arkansas 72115

S: USA



N: Christopher Li

E: sparse@chrisli.org

D: Sparse maintainer 2009 - 2018



N: Stephan Linz

E: linz@mazet.de

E: Stephan.Linz@gmx.de
@@ -2537,6 +2541,10 @@ S: Ormond 
S: Victoria 3163

S: Australia



N: Eric Miao

E: eric.y.miao@gmail.com

D: MMP support



N: Pauline Middelink

E: middelin@polyware.nl

D: General low-level bug fixes, /proc fixes, identd support
@@ -4111,6 +4119,10 @@ S: 1507 145th Place SE #B5 
S: Bellevue, Washington 98007

S: USA



N: Haojian Zhuang

E: haojian.zhuang@gmail.com

D: MMP support



N: Richard Zidlicky

E: rz@linux-m68k.org, rdzidlic@geocities.com

W: http://www.geocities.com/rdzidlic

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-dsa

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/tagging

What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/dsa/tagging

Date:		August 2018

KernelVersion:	4.20

Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

+62 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -856,7 +856,8 @@ 
			causing system reset or hang due to sending

			INIT from AP to BSP.



	disable_counter_freezing [HW]

	perf_v4_pmi=	[X86,INTEL]

			Format: <bool>

			Disable Intel PMU counter freezing feature.

			The feature only exists starting from

			Arch Perfmon v4 (Skylake and newer).
@@ -3504,6 +3505,10 @@ 
			before loading.

			See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.



	psi=		[KNL] Enable or disable pressure stall information

			tracking.

			Format: <bool>



	psmouse.proto=	[HW,MOUSE] Highest PS2 mouse protocol extension to

			probe for; one of (bare|imps|exps|lifebook|any).

	psmouse.rate=	[HW,MOUSE] Set desired mouse report rate, in reports
@@ -4194,9 +4199,13 @@ 


	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2

			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.

			The default operation protects the kernel from

			user space attacks.



			on   - unconditionally enable

			off  - unconditionally disable

			on   - unconditionally enable, implies

			       spectre_v2_user=on

			off  - unconditionally disable, implies

			       spectre_v2_user=off

			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is

			       vulnerable
@@ -4206,6 +4215,12 @@ 
			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the

			compiler with which the kernel was built.



			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation

			against user space to user space task attacks.



			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and

			the user space protections.



			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:



			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
@@ -4215,6 +4230,48 @@ 
			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2=auto.



	spectre_v2_user=

			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2

		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between

		        user space tasks



			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is

				  enforced by spectre_v2=on



			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is

				  enforced by spectre_v2=off



			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,

				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl

				  per thread.  The mitigation control state

				  is inherited on fork.



			prctl,ibpb

				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is

				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued

				  always when switching between different user

				  space processes.



			seccomp

				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp

				  threads will enable the mitigation unless

				  they explicitly opt out.



			seccomp,ibpb

				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is

				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued

				  always when switching between different

				  user space processes.



			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on

				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.



			Default mitigation:

			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"



			Not specifying this option is equivalent to

			spectre_v2_user=auto.



	spec_store_bypass_disable=

			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation

			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
@@ -4713,6 +4770,8 @@ 
					prevent spurious wakeup);

				n = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG (Device needs a

					pause after every control message);

				o = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET (Hub needs extra

					delay after resetting its port);

			Example: quirks=0781:5580:bk,0a5c:5834:gij



	usbhid.mousepoll=

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst

+11 −10
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -32,16 +32,17 @@ Disclosure and embargoed information 
The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination

below.



Once a robust fix has been developed, our preference is to release the

fix in a timely fashion, treating it no differently than any of the other

thousands of changes and fixes the Linux kernel project releases every

month.



However, at the request of the reporter, we will postpone releasing the

fix for up to 5 business days after the date of the report or after the

embargo has lifted; whichever comes first.  The only exception to that

rule is if the bug is publicly known, in which case the preference is to

release the fix as soon as it's available.

Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes

for publicly known bugs are released immediately.



Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs

as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of

the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start

of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days

if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The

only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate

the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release

coordination.



Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in

order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside

Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt

+1 −0
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@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ stable kernels. 
| ARM            | Cortex-A73      | #858921         | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921        |

| ARM            | Cortex-A55      | #1024718        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718       |

| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1188873        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873       |

| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1286807        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807       |

| ARM            | MMU-500         | #841119,#826419 | N/A                         |

|                |                 |                 |                             |

| Cavium         | ThunderX ITS    | #22375, #24313  | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375        |

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