Commit adb21d2b authored by Aleksa Sarai's avatar Aleksa Sarai Committed by Al Viro
Browse files

namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution

/* Background. */
There are many circumstances when userspace wants to resolve a path and
ensure that it doesn't go outside of a particular root directory during
resolution. Obvious examples include archive extraction tools, as well as
other security-conscious userspace programs. FreeBSD spun out O_BENEATH
from their Capsicum project[1,2], so it also seems reasonable to
implement similar functionality for Linux.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[3] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[5]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_BENEATH will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_BENEATH applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_BENEATH, any path component which attempts to "escape" the
starting point of the filesystem lookup (the dirfd passed to openat)
will yield -EXDEV. Thus, all absolute paths and symlinks are disallowed.

Due to a security concern brought up by Jann[6], any ".." path
components are also blocked. This restriction will be lifted in a future
patch, but requires more work to ensure that permitting ".." is done
safely.

Magic-link jumps are also blocked, because they can beam the path lookup
across the starting point. It would be possible to detect and block
only the "bad" crossings with path_is_under() checks, but it's unclear
whether it makes sense to permit magic-links at all. However, userspace
is recommended to pass LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS if they want to ensure that
magic-link crossing is entirely disabled.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_BENEATH is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2808
[2]: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17547
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1415094884-18349-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1jzNvxB+bfOBnERFGp=oMM0vHWuLD6EULmne3R6xa53w@mail.gmail.com/



Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: default avatarDavid Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Suggested-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
parent 72ba2929
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+74 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -641,6 +641,14 @@ static bool legitimize_links(struct nameidata *nd)

static bool legitimize_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
	/*
	 * For scoped-lookups (where nd->root has been zeroed), we need to
	 * restart the whole lookup from scratch -- because set_root() is wrong
	 * for these lookups (nd->dfd is the root, not the filesystem root).
	 */
	if (!nd->root.mnt && (nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
		return false;
	/* Nothing to do if nd->root is zero or is managed by the VFS user. */
	if (!nd->root.mnt || (nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
		return true;
	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED;
@@ -776,12 +784,37 @@ static int complete_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
	int status;

	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
		if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
		/*
		 * We don't want to zero nd->root for scoped-lookups or
		 * externally-managed nd->root.
		 */
		if (!(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_ROOT | LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)))
			nd->root.mnt = NULL;
		if (unlikely(unlazy_walk(nd)))
			return -ECHILD;
	}

	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)) {
		/*
		 * While the guarantee of LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED is (roughly) "don't
		 * ever step outside the root during lookup" and should already
		 * be guaranteed by the rest of namei, we want to avoid a namei
		 * BUG resulting in userspace being given a path that was not
		 * scoped within the root at some point during the lookup.
		 *
		 * So, do a final sanity-check to make sure that in the
		 * worst-case scenario (a complete bypass of LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)
		 * we won't silently return an fd completely outside of the
		 * requested root to userspace.
		 *
		 * Userspace could move the path outside the root after this
		 * check, but as discussed elsewhere this is not a concern (the
		 * resolved file was inside the root at some point).
		 */
		if (!path_is_under(&nd->path, &nd->root))
			return -EXDEV;
	}

	if (likely(!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_JUMPED)))
		return 0;

@@ -802,6 +835,14 @@ static int set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
	struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;

	/*
	 * Jumping to the real root in a scoped-lookup is a BUG in namei, but we
	 * still have to ensure it doesn't happen because it will cause a breakout
	 * from the dirfd.
	 */
	if (WARN_ON(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;

	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
		unsigned seq;

@@ -838,6 +879,8 @@ static inline void path_to_nameidata(const struct path *path,

static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
		return -EXDEV;
	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV)) {
		/* Absolute path arguments to path_init() are allowed. */
		if (nd->path.mnt != NULL && nd->path.mnt != nd->root.mnt)
@@ -883,6 +926,9 @@ int nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
		if (nd->path.mnt != path->mnt)
			goto err;
	}
	/* Not currently safe for scoped-lookups. */
	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
		goto err;

	path_put(&nd->path);
	nd->path = *path;
@@ -1385,8 +1431,11 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
	struct inode *inode = nd->inode;

	while (1) {
		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)) {
			if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
				return -ECHILD;
			break;
		}
		if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
			struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
			struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
@@ -1517,8 +1566,11 @@ static int path_parent_directory(struct path *path)
static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
{
	while (1) {
		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)) {
			if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
				return -EXDEV;
			break;
		}
		if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
			int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path);
			if (ret)
@@ -1741,6 +1793,13 @@ static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
	if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
		int error = 0;

		/*
		 * Scoped-lookup flags resolving ".." is not currently safe --
		 * races can cause our parent to have moved outside of the root
		 * and us to skip over it.
		 */
		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
			return -EXDEV;
		if (!nd->root.mnt) {
			error = set_root(nd);
			if (error)
@@ -2258,7 +2317,6 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
			get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd->path);
			nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
		}
		return s;
	} else {
		/* Caller must check execute permissions on the starting path component */
		struct fd f = fdget_raw(nd->dfd);
@@ -2283,8 +2341,18 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
			nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
		}
		fdput(f);
		return s;
	}
	/* For scoped-lookups we need to set the root to the dirfd as well. */
	if (flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED) {
		nd->root = nd->path;
		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
			nd->root_seq = nd->seq;
		} else {
			path_get(&nd->root);
			nd->flags |= LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED;
		}
	}
	return s;
}

static const char *trailing_symlink(struct nameidata *nd)
+4 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_NAMEI_H
#define _LINUX_NAMEI_H

#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS	0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS	0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_XDEV		0x040000 /* No mountpoint crossing. */
#define LOOKUP_BENEATH		0x080000 /* No escaping from starting point. */
/* LOOKUP_* flags which do scope-related checks based on the dirfd. */
#define LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED LOOKUP_BENEATH

extern int path_pts(struct path *path);