Commit acf784bd authored May 03, 2018 by Gustavo A. R. Silva Committed by David S. Miller May 04, 2018

net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1

ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
'dev_lec'

Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2



Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

parent 2be147f7

net/atm/lec.c

+7 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ static unsigned char bridge_ula_lec[] = { 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00 };
		#include <linux/module.h>
		#include <linux/init.h>

		/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
		#include <linux/nospec.h>

		#include "lec.h"
		#include "lec_arpc.h"
		#include "resources.h"
		@@ -687,8 +690,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc vcc, void __user arg)
		bytes_left = copy_from_user(&ioc_data, arg, sizeof(struct atmlec_ioc));
		if (bytes_left != 0)
		pr_info("copy from user failed for %d bytes\n", bytes_left);
		if (ioc_data.dev_num < 0 \|\| ioc_data.dev_num >= MAX_LEC_ITF \|\|
		!dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num])
		if (ioc_data.dev_num < 0 \|\| ioc_data.dev_num >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
		return -EINVAL;
		ioc_data.dev_num = array_index_nospec(ioc_data.dev_num, MAX_LEC_ITF);
		if (!dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num])
		return -EINVAL;
		vpriv = kmalloc(sizeof(struct lec_vcc_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!vpriv)

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