Commit ab57b335 authored by Eric Biggers's avatar Eric Biggers Committed by Herbert Xu
Browse files

crypto: bcm - convert to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys() 



Convert the bcm crypto driver to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys() so
that it picks up the fix for broken validation of rtattr::rta_len.

This also fixes the DES weak key check to actually be done on the right
key. (It was checking the authentication key, not the encryption key...)

Fixes: 9d12ba86 ("crypto: brcm - Add Broadcom SPU driver")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
parent 8f9c4693

drivers/crypto/Kconfig

+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_BCM_SPU 
	depends on ARCH_BCM_IPROC

	depends on MAILBOX

	default m

	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC

	select CRYPTO_DES

	select CRYPTO_MD5

	select CRYPTO_SHA1

drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c

+13 −31
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2845,44 +2845,28 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, 
	struct spu_hw *spu = &iproc_priv.spu;

	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);

	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(cipher);

	struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key;

	struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;

	const u8 *origkey = key;

	const unsigned int origkeylen = keylen;



	int ret = 0;

	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;

	int ret;



	flow_log("%s() aead:%p key:%p keylen:%u\n", __func__, cipher, key,

		 keylen);

	flow_dump("  key: ", key, keylen);



	if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))

		goto badkey;

	if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)

		goto badkey;

	if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))

	ret = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen);

	if (ret)

		goto badkey;



	param = RTA_DATA(rta);

	ctx->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);



	key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);

	keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);



	if (keylen < ctx->enckeylen)

		goto badkey;

	if (ctx->enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)

	if (keys.enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE ||

	    keys.authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)

		goto badkey;



	ctx->authkeylen = keylen - ctx->enckeylen;



	if (ctx->authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)

		goto badkey;

	ctx->enckeylen = keys.enckeylen;

	ctx->authkeylen = keys.authkeylen;



	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->authkeylen, ctx->enckeylen);

	memcpy(ctx->enckey, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);

	/* May end up padding auth key. So make sure it's zeroed. */

	memset(ctx->authkey, 0, sizeof(ctx->authkey));

	memcpy(ctx->authkey, key, ctx->authkeylen);

	memcpy(ctx->authkey, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen);



	switch (ctx->alg->cipher_info.alg) {

	case CIPHER_ALG_DES:
@@ -2890,7 +2874,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, 
			u32 tmp[DES_EXPKEY_WORDS];

			u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;



			if (des_ekey(tmp, key) == 0) {

			if (des_ekey(tmp, keys.enckey) == 0) {

				if (crypto_aead_get_flags(cipher) &

				    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY) {

					crypto_aead_set_flags(cipher, flags);
@@ -2905,7 +2889,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, 
		break;

	case CIPHER_ALG_3DES:

		if (ctx->enckeylen == (DES_KEY_SIZE * 3)) {

			const u32 *K = (const u32 *)key;

			const u32 *K = (const u32 *)keys.enckey;

			u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;



			if (!((K[0] ^ K[2]) | (K[1] ^ K[3])) ||
@@ -2956,9 +2940,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, 
		ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;

		ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags |=

		    tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;

		ret =

		    crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, origkey,

				       origkeylen);

		ret = crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, key, keylen);

		if (ret) {

			flow_log("  fallback setkey() returned:%d\n", ret);

			tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;

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