Commit a511e1af authored by David Howells's avatar David Howells
Browse files

KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() 



Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
parent 99716b7c

certs/system_keyring.c

+17 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -18,12 +18,26 @@ 
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>

#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>



struct key *system_trusted_keyring;

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);

static struct key *system_trusted_keyring;



extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];

extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;



/**

 * restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by system CA

 *

 * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added

 * being vouched for by a key in the system keyring.

 */

int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,

				     const struct key_type *type,

				     unsigned long flags,

				     const union key_payload *payload)

{

	return restrict_link_by_signature(system_trusted_keyring,

					  type, payload);

}



/*

 * Load the compiled-in keys

 */
@@ -37,7 +51,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) 
			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |

			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),

			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,

			      keyring_restrict_trusted_only, NULL);

			      restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);

	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))

		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");

	return 0;

crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c

+32 −30
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate

 *

 * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)

 *

 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -9,20 +9,12 @@ 
 * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.

 */



#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt

#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt

#include <linux/module.h>

#include <linux/kernel.h>

#include <linux/slab.h>

#include <linux/err.h>

#include <linux/mpi.h>

#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>

#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>

#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>

#include <keys/system_keyring.h>

#include <crypto/hash.h>

#include <crypto/public_key.h>

#include "asymmetric_keys.h"

#include "x509_parser.h"



static bool use_builtin_keys;

static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
@@ -62,45 +54,55 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) 
__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);

#endif



/*

/**

 * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys

 * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.

 * @type: The type of key being added.

 * @payload: The payload of the new key.

 *

 * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of

 * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the

 * new certificate as being trusted.

 *

 * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't

 * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there

 * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.

 * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a

 * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the

 * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if

 * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.

 */

int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,

			struct key *trust_keyring)

int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,

			       const struct key_type *type,

			       const union key_payload *payload)

{

	struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;

	const struct public_key_signature *sig;

	struct key *key;

	int ret = 1;

	int ret;



	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])

		return 1;

	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);



	if (!trust_keyring)

		return -ENOKEY;



	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)

		return -EOPNOTSUPP;



	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];

	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])

		return 0;



	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))

		return -EPERM;

	if (cert->unsupported_sig)

		return -ENOPKG;



	/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */

	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,

				  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],

				  false);

	if (IS_ERR(key))

		return PTR_ERR(key);

		return -ENOKEY;



	if (!use_builtin_keys ||

	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) {

		ret = verify_signature(key, cert->sig);

		if (ret == -ENOPKG)

			cert->unsupported_sig = true;

	}

	if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))

		ret = -ENOKEY;

	else

		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);

	key_put(key);

	return ret;

}
 
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_validate_trust);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h

+0 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -58,9 +58,3 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen, 
 */

extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);

extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
 


/*

 * public_key_trust.c

 */

extern int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,

			       struct key *trust_keyring);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

+1 −20
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -178,31 +178,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) 


	cert->pub->id_type = "X509";



	/* See if we can derive the trustability of this certificate.

	 *

	 * When it comes to self-signed certificates, we cannot evaluate

	 * trustedness except by the fact that we obtained it from a trusted

	 * location.  So we just rely on x509_validate_trust() failing in this

	 * case.

	 *

	 * Note that there's a possibility of a self-signed cert matching a

	 * cert that we have (most likely a duplicate that we already trust) -

	 * in which case it will be marked trusted.

	 */

	if (cert->unsupported_sig || cert->self_signed) {

	if (cert->unsupported_sig) {

		public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);

		cert->sig = NULL;

	} else {

		pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",

			 cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);



		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());

		if (ret)

			ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());

		if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)

			goto error_free_cert;

		if (!ret)

			prep->trusted = true;

	}



	/* Propose a description */

include/crypto/public_key.h

+7 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@ extern void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig); 
extern struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype;



struct key;

struct key_type;

union key_payload;



extern int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,

				      const struct key_type *type,

				      const union key_payload *payload);



extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,

			    const struct public_key_signature *sig);

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