Commit 9de7922b authored by Daniel Borkmann's avatar Daniel Borkmann Committed by David S. Miller
Browse files

net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks 



Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent b838b4ac

include/net/sctp/sm.h

+3 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(struct sctp_association *, 
					      int, __be16);

struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(struct sctp_association *asoc,

					     union sctp_addr *addr);

int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,

		       struct sctp_paramhdr *param_hdr, void *chunk_end,

bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,

			struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,

			struct sctp_paramhdr **errp);

struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,

				       struct sctp_chunk *asconf);

net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c

+55 −44
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -3111,49 +3111,62 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, 
}



/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it. */

int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,

		       struct sctp_paramhdr *param_hdr, void *chunk_end,

		       struct sctp_paramhdr **errp) {

	sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;

bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,

			struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,

			struct sctp_paramhdr **errp)

{

	sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;

	union sctp_params param;

	int length, plen;

	bool addr_param_seen = false;



	param.v = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) param_hdr;

	while (param.v <= chunk_end - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {

		length = ntohs(param.p->length);

		*errp = param.p;



		if (param.v > chunk_end - length ||

		    length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))

			return 0;

	sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {

		size_t length = ntohs(param.p->length);



		*errp = param.p;

		switch (param.p->type) {

		case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE:

			break;

		case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:

			if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv4addr_param_t))

				return false;

			addr_param_seen = true;

			break;

		case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:

			if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t))

				return false;

			addr_param_seen = true;

			break;

		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:

		case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:

		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:

			asconf_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)param.v;

			plen = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);

			if (plen < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +

			/* In ASCONF chunks, these need to be first. */

			if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)

				return false;

			length = ntohs(param.addip->param_hdr.length);

			if (length < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +

				     sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))

				return 0;

				return false;

			break;

		case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:

		case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:

			if (length != sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t))

				return 0;



				return false;

			break;

		default:

			break;

			/* This is unkown to us, reject! */

			return false;

		}



		param.v += WORD_ROUND(length);

	}



	if (param.v != chunk_end)

		return 0;

	/* Remaining sanity checks. */

	if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)

		return false;

	if (!addr_param_needed && addr_param_seen)

		return false;

	if (param.v != chunk->chunk_end)

		return false;



	return 1;

	return true;

}



/* Process an incoming ASCONF chunk with the next expected serial no. and
@@ -3162,16 +3175,17 @@ int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc, 
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,

				       struct sctp_chunk *asconf)

{

	sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) asconf->chunk_hdr;

	bool all_param_pass = true;

	union sctp_params param;

	sctp_addiphdr_t		*hdr;

	union sctp_addr_param	*addr_param;

	sctp_addip_param_t	*asconf_param;

	struct sctp_chunk	*asconf_ack;



	__be16	err_code;

	int	length = 0;

	int	chunk_len;

	__u32	serial;

	int	all_param_pass = 1;



	chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);

	hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
@@ -3199,9 +3213,14 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc, 
		goto done;



	/* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */

	while (chunk_len > 0) {

	sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {

		/* Skip preceeding address parameters. */

		if (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||

		    param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)

			continue;



		err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf,

						     asconf_param);

						     param.addip);

		/* ADDIP 4.1 A7)

		 * If an error response is received for a TLV parameter,

		 * all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are
@@ -3209,28 +3228,20 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc, 
		 * the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless

		 * a specific success indication is present for the parameter.

		 */

		if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code)

			all_param_pass = 0;



		if (err_code != SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR)

			all_param_pass = false;

		if (!all_param_pass)

			sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack,

						 asconf_param->crr_id, err_code,

						 asconf_param);

			sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack, param.addip->crr_id,

						 err_code, param.addip);



		/* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add

		 * an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it

		 * MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled

		 * in the ASCONF.

		 */

		if (SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW == err_code)

		if (err_code == SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW)

			goto done;



		/* Move to the next ASCONF param. */

		length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);

		asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

		chunk_len -= length;

	}



done:

	asoc->peer.addip_serial++;

net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c

+2 −16
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -3591,9 +3591,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, 
	struct sctp_chunk	*asconf_ack = NULL;

	struct sctp_paramhdr	*err_param = NULL;

	sctp_addiphdr_t		*hdr;

	union sctp_addr_param	*addr_param;

	__u32			serial;

	int			length;



	if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {

		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
@@ -3618,17 +3616,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, 
	hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;

	serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);



	addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;

	length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);

	if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))

		return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,

			   (void *)addr_param, commands);



	/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */

	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,

			    (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),

			    (void *)chunk->chunk_end,

			    &err_param))

	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, chunk, true, &err_param))

		return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,

						  (void *)err_param, commands);
@@ -3745,10 +3734,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, 
	rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);



	/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */

	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,

	    (sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,

	    (void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,

	    &err_param))

	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, asconf_ack, false, &err_param))

		return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,

			   (void *)err_param, commands);

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