Commit 84c37c16 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
Browse files

Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random 

Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Change get_random_{int,log} to use the CRNG used by /dev/urandom and
  getrandom(2). It's faster and arguably more secure than cut-down MD5
  that we had been using.

  Also do some code cleanup"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block
  random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64
  random: use chacha20 for get_random_int/long
  random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed
  random: remove variable limit
  random: remove stale urandom_init_wait
  random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng
parents 434fd635 db61ffe3

drivers/char/random.c

+50 −79
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -312,13 +312,6 @@ static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; 
 */

static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;



/*

 * The minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding.  We

 * do this to limit the amount of entropy that can be drained from the

 * input pool even if there are heavy demands on /dev/urandom.

 */

static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;



/*

 * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords

 * over GF(2).  The taps for various sizes are defined below.  They
@@ -409,7 +402,6 @@ static struct poolinfo { 
 */

static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);

static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);

static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait);

static struct fasync_struct *fasync;



static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
@@ -467,7 +459,6 @@ struct entropy_store { 
	int entropy_count;

	int entropy_total;

	unsigned int initialized:1;

	unsigned int limit:1;

	unsigned int last_data_init:1;

	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];

};
@@ -485,7 +476,6 @@ static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; 
static struct entropy_store input_pool = {

	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],

	.name = "input",

	.limit = 1,

	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),

	.pool = input_pool_data

};
@@ -493,7 +483,6 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool = { 
static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {

	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],

	.name = "blocking",

	.limit = 1,

	.pull = &input_pool,

	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock),

	.pool = blocking_pool_data,
@@ -855,13 +844,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) 
	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);

}



static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void)

{

	if (crng_init > 2 &&

	    time_after(jiffies, primary_crng.init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))

		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);

}



static inline void crng_wait_ready(void)

{

	wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
@@ -1220,15 +1202,6 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) 
	    r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)

		return;



	if (r->limit == 0 && random_min_urandom_seed) {

		unsigned long now = jiffies;



		if (time_before(now,

				r->last_pulled + random_min_urandom_seed * HZ))

			return;

		r->last_pulled = now;

	}



	_xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);

}
@@ -1236,8 +1209,6 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) 
{

	__u32	tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];



	/* For /dev/random's pool, always leave two wakeups' worth */

	int rsvd_bytes = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_bits / 4;

	int bytes = nbytes;



	/* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
@@ -1248,7 +1219,7 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) 
	trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,

				  ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));

	bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,

				random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, rsvd_bytes);

				random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);

	mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);

	credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);

}
@@ -1276,7 +1247,7 @@ static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work) 
static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,

		      int reserved)

{

	int entropy_count, orig;

	int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;

	size_t ibytes, nfrac;



	BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
@@ -1285,14 +1256,12 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, 
retry:

	entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);

	ibytes = nbytes;

	/* If limited, never pull more than available */

	if (r->limit) {

		int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);

	/* never pull more than available */

	have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);



	if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)

		have_bytes = 0;

	ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);

	}

	if (ibytes < min)

		ibytes = 0;
@@ -1912,6 +1881,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, 
static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;

static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;

static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;

static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;

static char sysctl_bootid[16];



/*
@@ -2042,63 +2012,64 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { 
};

#endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */



static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;



int random_int_secret_init(void)

{

	get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));

	return 0;

}



static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash)

		__aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));

struct batched_entropy {

	union {

		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];

		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];

	};

	unsigned int position;

};



/*

 * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but

 * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random

 * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of

 * depleting entropy is too high

 * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random

 * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the

 * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.

 */

unsigned int get_random_int(void)

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);

u64 get_random_u64(void)

{

	__u32 *hash;

	unsigned int ret;

	u64 ret;

	struct batched_entropy *batch;



	if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))

#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64

	if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret))

		return ret;

#else

	if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret) &&

	    arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret + 1))

	    return ret;

#endif



	hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);



	hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();

	md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);

	ret = hash[0];

	put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);



	batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);

	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {

		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);

		batch->position = 0;

	}

	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];

	put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);

	return ret;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int);

EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);



/*

 * Same as get_random_int(), but returns unsigned long.

 */

unsigned long get_random_long(void)

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32);

u32 get_random_u32(void)

{

	__u32 *hash;

	unsigned long ret;

	u32 ret;

	struct batched_entropy *batch;



	if (arch_get_random_long(&ret))

	if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))

		return ret;



	hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);



	hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();

	md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);

	ret = *(unsigned long *)hash;

	put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);



	batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);

	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {

		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);

		batch->position = 0;

	}

	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];

	put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);

	return ret;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);

EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);



/**

 * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address

include/linux/random.h

+15 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -37,14 +37,26 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); 
extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);

extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);

extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);

extern int random_int_secret_init(void);



#ifndef MODULE

extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;

#endif



unsigned int get_random_int(void);

unsigned long get_random_long(void);

u32 get_random_u32(void);

u64 get_random_u64(void);

static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)

{

	return get_random_u32();

}

static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)

{

#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64

	return get_random_u64();

#else

	return get_random_u32();

#endif

}



unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);



u32 prandom_u32(void);

init/main.c

+0 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -882,7 +882,6 @@ static void __init do_basic_setup(void) 
	do_ctors();

	usermodehelper_enable();

	do_initcalls();

	random_int_secret_init();

}



static void __init do_pre_smp_initcalls(void)

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