Commit 7c7fdaf6 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
Browse files

Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt 

Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers:
 "This release there are some fixes for longstanding problems, as well
  as some cleanups:

   - Fix a race condition where a duplicate filename could be created in
     an encrypted directory if a syscall that creates a new filename
     raced with the directory's encryption key being added.

   - Allow deleting files that use an unsupported encryption policy.

   - Simplify the locking for 'struct fscrypt_master_key'.

   - Remove kernel-internal constants from the UAPI header.

  As usual, all these patches have been in linux-next with no reported
  issues, and I've tested them with xfstests"

* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt:
  fscrypt: allow deleting files with unsupported encryption policy
  fscrypt: unexport fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
  fscrypt: move fscrypt_require_key() to fscrypt_private.h
  fscrypt: move body of fscrypt_prepare_setattr() out-of-line
  fscrypt: introduce fscrypt_prepare_readdir()
  ext4: don't call fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from dx_show_leaf()
  ubifs: remove ubifs_dir_open()
  f2fs: remove f2fs_dir_open()
  ext4: remove ext4_dir_open()
  fscrypt: simplify master key locking
  fscrypt: remove unnecessary calls to fscrypt_require_key()
  ubifs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames
  f2fs: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames
  ext4: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames
  fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()
  fscrypt: remove kernel-internal constants from UAPI header
parents da062855 a14d0b67

fs/crypto/fname.c

+6 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, 
		fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;

		return 0;

	}

	ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);

	ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir, lookup);

	if (ret)

		return ret;
@@ -560,7 +560,11 @@ int fscrypt_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) 
		return -ECHILD;



	dir = dget_parent(dentry);

	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(d_inode(dir));

	/*

	 * Pass allow_unsupported=true, so that files with an unsupported

	 * encryption policy can be deleted.

	 */

	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(d_inode(dir), true);

	valid = !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(d_inode(dir));

	dput(dir);

fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h

+40 −16
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ 
#define FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1	1

#define FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2	2



/* Keep this in sync with include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h */

#define FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX	FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM



struct fscrypt_context_v1 {

	u8 version; /* FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1 */

	u8 contents_encryption_mode;
@@ -436,16 +439,9 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { 
	 * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can be retried, or

	 * FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can add the secret again.

	 *

	 * Locking: protected by key->sem (outer) and mk_secret_sem (inner).

	 * The reason for two locks is that key->sem also protects modifying

	 * mk_users, which ranks it above the semaphore for the keyring key

	 * type, which is in turn above page faults (via keyring_read).  But

	 * sometimes filesystems call fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from within

	 * a transaction, which ranks it below page faults.  So we need a

	 * separate lock which protects mk_secret but not also mk_users.

	 * Locking: protected by this master key's key->sem.

	 */

	struct fscrypt_master_key_secret	mk_secret;

	struct rw_semaphore			mk_secret_sem;



	/*

	 * For v1 policy keys: an arbitrary key descriptor which was assigned by
@@ -464,8 +460,8 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { 
	 *

	 * This is NULL for v1 policy keys; those can only be added by root.

	 *

	 * Locking: in addition to this keyrings own semaphore, this is

	 * protected by the master key's key->sem, so we can do atomic

	 * Locking: in addition to this keyring's own semaphore, this is

	 * protected by this master key's key->sem, so we can do atomic

	 * search+insert.  It can also be searched without taking any locks, but

	 * in that case the returned key may have already been removed.

	 */
@@ -491,9 +487,9 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { 
	 * Per-mode encryption keys for the various types of encryption policies

	 * that use them.  Allocated and derived on-demand.

	 */

	struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_direct_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];

	struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];

	struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];

	struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_direct_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];

	struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];

	struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];



	/* Hash key for inode numbers.  Initialized only when needed. */

	siphash_key_t		mk_ino_hash_key;
@@ -507,9 +503,9 @@ is_master_key_secret_present(const struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret) 
	/*

	 * The READ_ONCE() is only necessary for fscrypt_drop_inode() and

	 * fscrypt_key_describe().  These run in atomic context, so they can't

	 * take ->mk_secret_sem and thus 'secret' can change concurrently which

	 * would be a data race.  But they only need to know whether the secret

	 * *was* present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices.

	 * take the key semaphore and thus 'secret' can change concurrently

	 * which would be a data race.  But they only need to know whether the

	 * secret *was* present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices.

	 */

	return READ_ONCE(secret->size) != 0;

}
@@ -575,6 +571,34 @@ int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, 
void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci,

			       const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);



int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported);



/**

 * fscrypt_require_key() - require an inode's encryption key

 * @inode: the inode we need the key for

 *

 * If the inode is encrypted, set up its encryption key if not already done.

 * Then require that the key be present and return -ENOKEY otherwise.

 *

 * No locks are needed, and the key will live as long as the struct inode --- so

 * it won't go away from under you.

 *

 * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code

 * if a problem occurred while setting up the encryption key.

 */

static inline int fscrypt_require_key(struct inode *inode)

{

	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {

		int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode, false);



		if (err)

			return err;

		if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))

			return -ENOKEY;

	}

	return 0;

}



/* keysetup_v1.c */



void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk);

fs/crypto/hooks.c

+31 −24
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -54,15 +54,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open); 
int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

			   struct dentry *dentry)

{

	int err;



	err = fscrypt_require_key(dir);

	if (err)

		return err;



	/* ... in case we looked up no-key name before key was added */

	if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME)

	if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry))

		return -ENOKEY;

	/*

	 * We don't need to separately check that the directory inode's key is

	 * available, as it's implied by the dentry not being a no-key name.

	 */



	if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode))

		return -EXDEV;
@@ -75,19 +72,13 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 
			     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,

			     unsigned int flags)

{

	int err;



	err = fscrypt_require_key(old_dir);

	if (err)

		return err;



	err = fscrypt_require_key(new_dir);

	if (err)

		return err;



	/* ... in case we looked up no-key name(s) before key was added */

	if ((old_dentry->d_flags | new_dentry->d_flags) & DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME)

	if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(old_dentry) ||

	    fscrypt_is_nokey_name(new_dentry))

		return -ENOKEY;

	/*

	 * We don't need to separately check that the directory inodes' keys are

	 * available, as it's implied by the dentries not being no-key names.

	 */



	if (old_dir != new_dir) {

		if (IS_ENCRYPTED(new_dir) &&
@@ -123,6 +114,20 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup);



int __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir)

{

	return fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir, true);

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_readdir);



int __fscrypt_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)

{

	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)

		return fscrypt_require_key(d_inode(dentry));

	return 0;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_setattr);



/**

 * fscrypt_prepare_setflags() - prepare to change flags with FS_IOC_SETFLAGS

 * @inode: the inode on which flags are being changed
@@ -138,6 +143,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, 
			     unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags)

{

	struct fscrypt_info *ci;

	struct key *key;

	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;

	int err;
@@ -153,13 +159,14 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, 
		ci = inode->i_crypt_info;

		if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2)

			return -EINVAL;

		mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0];

		down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

		key = ci->ci_master_key;

		mk = key->payload.data[0];

		down_read(&key->sem);

		if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))

			err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);

		else

			err = -ENOKEY;

		up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

		up_read(&key->sem);

		return err;

	}

	return 0;
@@ -325,7 +332,7 @@ const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr, 
	 * Try to set up the symlink's encryption key, but we can continue

	 * regardless of whether the key is available or not.

	 */

	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode);

	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode, false);

	if (err)

		return ERR_PTR(err);

	has_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode);

fs/crypto/keyring.c

+2 −8
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) 


	wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);



	for (i = 0; i <= __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) {

	for (i = 0; i <= FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) {

		fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&mk->mk_direct_keys[i]);

		fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[i]);

		fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[i]);
@@ -347,7 +347,6 @@ static int add_new_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret, 
	mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec;



	move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);

	init_rwsem(&mk->mk_secret_sem);



	refcount_set(&mk->mk_refcount, 1); /* secret is present */

	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes);
@@ -427,11 +426,8 @@ static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, 
	}



	/* Re-add the secret if needed. */

	if (rekey) {

		down_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

	if (rekey)

		move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);

		up_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

	}

	return 0;

}
@@ -975,10 +971,8 @@ static int do_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg, bool all_users) 
	/* No user claims remaining.  Go ahead and wipe the secret. */

	dead = false;

	if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {

		down_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

		wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);

		dead = refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_refcount);

		up_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

	}

	up_write(&key->sem);

	if (dead) {

fs/crypto/keysetup.c

+29 −15
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode * 
select_encryption_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,

		       const struct inode *inode)

{

	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(fscrypt_modes) != FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1);



	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))

		return &fscrypt_modes[fscrypt_policy_contents_mode(policy)];
@@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, 
	unsigned int hkdf_infolen = 0;

	int err;



	if (WARN_ON(mode_num > __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX))

	if (WARN_ON(mode_num > FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX))

		return -EINVAL;



	prep_key = &keys[mode_num];
@@ -335,11 +337,11 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, 
 * Find the master key, then set up the inode's actual encryption key.

 *

 * If the master key is found in the filesystem-level keyring, then the

 * corresponding 'struct key' is returned in *master_key_ret with

 * ->mk_secret_sem read-locked.  This is needed to ensure that only one task

 * links the fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as multiple tasks may race

 * to create an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to synchronize the master

 * key being removed with a new inode starting to use it.

 * corresponding 'struct key' is returned in *master_key_ret with its semaphore

 * read-locked.  This is needed to ensure that only one task links the

 * fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as multiple tasks may race to create

 * an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to synchronize the master key being

 * removed with a new inode starting to use it.

 */

static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,

				     bool need_dirhash_key,
@@ -388,7 +390,7 @@ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, 
	}



	mk = key->payload.data[0];

	down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

	down_read(&key->sem);



	/* Has the secret been removed (via FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY)? */

	if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, 
	return 0;



out_release_key:

	up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

	up_read(&key->sem);

	key_put(key);

	return err;

}
@@ -534,9 +536,7 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, 
	res = 0;

out:

	if (master_key) {

		struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = master_key->payload.data[0];



		up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);

		up_read(&master_key->sem);

		key_put(master_key);

	}

	put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
@@ -546,6 +546,11 @@ out: 
/**

 * fscrypt_get_encryption_info() - set up an inode's encryption key

 * @inode: the inode to set up the key for.  Must be encrypted.

 * @allow_unsupported: if %true, treat an unsupported encryption policy (or

 *		       unrecognized encryption context) the same way as the key

 *		       being unavailable, instead of returning an error.  Use

 *		       %false unless the operation being performed is needed in

 *		       order for files (or directories) to be deleted.

 *

 * Set up ->i_crypt_info, if it hasn't already been done.

 *
@@ -556,7 +561,7 @@ out: 
 *	   encryption key is unavailable.  (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to

 *	   distinguish these cases.)  Also can return another -errno code.

 */

int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)

int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported)

{

	int res;

	union fscrypt_context ctx;
@@ -567,29 +572,38 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) 


	res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));

	if (res < 0) {

		if (res == -ERANGE && allow_unsupported)

			return 0;

		fscrypt_warn(inode, "Error %d getting encryption context", res);

		return res;

	}



	res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&policy, &ctx, res);

	if (res) {

		if (allow_unsupported)

			return 0;

		fscrypt_warn(inode,

			     "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context");

		return res;

	}



	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&policy, inode))

	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&policy, inode)) {

		if (allow_unsupported)

			return 0;

		return -EINVAL;

	}



	res = fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, &policy,

					    fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx),

					    IS_CASEFOLDED(inode) &&

					    S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode));



	if (res == -ENOPKG && allow_unsupported) /* Algorithm unavailable? */

		res = 0;

	if (res == -ENOKEY)

		res = 0;

	return res;

}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info);



/**

 * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() - prepare to create a new inode in a directory
@@ -710,7 +724,7 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode) 
		return 0;



	/*

	 * Note: since we aren't holding ->mk_secret_sem, the result here can

	 * Note: since we aren't holding the key semaphore, the result here can

	 * immediately become outdated.  But there's no correctness problem with

	 * unnecessarily evicting.  Nor is there a correctness problem with not

	 * evicting while iput() is racing with the key being removed, since

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