USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response (6817ae22) · Commits · 戴 / test

This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64 bytes leading a buffer overflow. Signed-off-by:

James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

drivers/usb/serial/whiteheat.c

+6 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -514,6 +514,10 @@ static void command_port_read_callback(struct urb *urb)
		dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - command_info is NULL, exiting.\n", __func__);
		return;
		}
		if (!urb->actual_length) {
		dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - empty response, exiting.\n", __func__);
		return;
		}
		if (status) {
		dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero urb status: %d\n", __func__, status);
		if (status != -ENOENT)
		@@ -534,7 +538,8 @@ static void command_port_read_callback(struct urb *urb)
		/* These are unsolicited reports from the firmware, hence no
		waiting command to wakeup */
		dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - event received\n", __func__);
		} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS) {
		} else if ((data[0] == WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS) &&
		(urb->actual_length - 1 <= sizeof(command_info->result_buffer))) {
		memcpy(command_info->result_buffer, &data[1],
		urb->actual_length - 1);
		command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE;

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