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A malicious USB device may feed in carefully crafted min/max/res values, so that the inner loop in parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() could run for a long time or even never terminate, e.g., given max = INT_MAX. Also nr_rates could be a large integer, which causes an integer overflow in the subsequent call to kmalloc() in parse_audio_format_rates_v2(). Thus, kmalloc() would allocate a smaller buffer than expected, leading to a memory corruption. To exploit the two vulnerabilities, an attacker needs physical access to the machine to plug in a malicious USB device. This patch makes two changes. 1) The type of "rate" is changed to unsigned int, so that the loop could stop once "rate" is larger than INT_MAX. 2) Limit nr_rates to 1024. Suggested-by:Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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