Commit 4f11918a authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
Browse files

Merge branch 'readdir' (readdir speedup and sanity checking) 

This makes getdents() and getdents64() do sanity checking on the
pathname that it gives to user space.  And to mitigate the performance
impact of that, it first cleans up the way it does the user copying, so
that the code avoids doing the SMAP/PAN updates between each part of the
dirent structure write.

I really wanted to do this during the merge window, but didn't have
time.  The conversion of filldir to unsafe_put_user() is something I've
had around for years now in a private branch, but the extra pathname
checking finally made me clean it up to the point where it is mergable.

It's worth noting that the filename validity checking really should be a
bit smarter: it would be much better to delay the error reporting until
the end of the readdir, so that non-corrupted filenames are still
returned.  But that involves bigger changes, so let's see if anybody
actually hits the corrupt directory entry case before worrying about it
further.

* branch 'readdir':
  Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry filename is valid
  Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
parents 9819a30c 8a23eb80

fs/readdir.c

+133 −35
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -20,9 +20,63 @@ 
#include <linux/syscalls.h>

#include <linux/unistd.h>

#include <linux/compat.h>



#include <linux/uaccess.h>



#include <asm/unaligned.h>



/*

 * Note the "unsafe_put_user() semantics: we goto a

 * label for errors.

 *

 * Also note how we use a "while()" loop here, even though

 * only the biggest size needs to loop. The compiler (well,

 * at least gcc) is smart enough to turn the smaller sizes

 * into just if-statements, and this way we don't need to

 * care whether 'u64' or 'u32' is the biggest size.

 */

#define unsafe_copy_loop(dst, src, len, type, label) 		\

	while (len >= sizeof(type)) {				\

		unsafe_put_user(get_unaligned((type *)src),	\

			(type __user *)dst, label);		\

		dst += sizeof(type);				\

		src += sizeof(type);				\

		len -= sizeof(type);				\

	}



/*

 * We avoid doing 64-bit copies on 32-bit architectures. They

 * might be better, but the component names are mostly small,

 * and the 64-bit cases can end up being much more complex and

 * put much more register pressure on the code, so it's likely

 * not worth the pain of unaligned accesses etc.

 *

 * So limit the copies to "unsigned long" size. I did verify

 * that at least the x86-32 case is ok without this limiting,

 * but I worry about random other legacy 32-bit cases that

 * might not do as well.

 */

#define unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, type, label) do {	\

	if (sizeof(type) <= sizeof(unsigned long))		\

		unsafe_copy_loop(dst, src, len, type, label);	\

} while (0)



/*

 * Copy the dirent name to user space, and NUL-terminate

 * it. This should not be a function call, since we're doing

 * the copy inside a "user_access_begin/end()" section.

 */

#define unsafe_copy_dirent_name(_dst, _src, _len, label) do {	\

	char __user *dst = (_dst);				\

	const char *src = (_src);				\

	size_t len = (_len);					\

	unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u64, label);	 	\

	unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u32, label);		\

	unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u16, label);		\

	unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u8,  label);		\

	unsafe_put_user(0, dst, label);				\

} while (0)





int iterate_dir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)

{

	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -64,6 +118,40 @@ out: 
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(iterate_dir);



/*

 * POSIX says that a dirent name cannot contain NULL or a '/'.

 *

 * It's not 100% clear what we should really do in this case.

 * The filesystem is clearly corrupted, but returning a hard

 * error means that you now don't see any of the other names

 * either, so that isn't a perfect alternative.

 *

 * And if you return an error, what error do you use? Several

 * filesystems seem to have decided on EUCLEAN being the error

 * code for EFSCORRUPTED, and that may be the error to use. Or

 * just EIO, which is perhaps more obvious to users.

 *

 * In order to see the other file names in the directory, the

 * caller might want to make this a "soft" error: skip the

 * entry, and return the error at the end instead.

 *

 * Note that this should likely do a "memchr(name, 0, len)"

 * check too, since that would be filesystem corruption as

 * well. However, that case can't actually confuse user space,

 * which has to do a strlen() on the name anyway to find the

 * filename length, and the above "soft error" worry means

 * that it's probably better left alone until we have that

 * issue clarified.

 */

static int verify_dirent_name(const char *name, int len)

{

	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!len))

		return -EIO;

	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(memchr(name, '/', len)))

		return -EIO;

	return 0;

}



/*

 * Traditional linux readdir() handling..

 *
@@ -173,6 +261,9 @@ static int filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, 
	int reclen = ALIGN(offsetof(struct linux_dirent, d_name) + namlen + 2,

		sizeof(long));



	buf->error = verify_dirent_name(name, namlen);

	if (unlikely(buf->error))

		return buf->error;

	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */

	if (reclen > buf->count)

		return -EINVAL;
@@ -182,28 +273,31 @@ static int filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, 
		return -EOVERFLOW;

	}

	dirent = buf->previous;

	if (dirent) {

		if (signal_pending(current))

	if (dirent && signal_pending(current))

		return -EINTR;

		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))



	/*

	 * Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).

	 * The real range was checked in getdents

	 */

	if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))

		goto efault;

	}

	if (dirent)

		unsafe_put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off, efault_end);

	dirent = buf->current_dir;

	if (__put_user(d_ino, &dirent->d_ino))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen))

		goto efault;

	if (copy_to_user(dirent->d_name, name, namlen))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(0, dirent->d_name + namlen))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(d_type, (char __user *) dirent + reclen - 1))

		goto efault;

	unsafe_put_user(d_ino, &dirent->d_ino, efault_end);

	unsafe_put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen, efault_end);

	unsafe_put_user(d_type, (char __user *) dirent + reclen - 1, efault_end);

	unsafe_copy_dirent_name(dirent->d_name, name, namlen, efault_end);

	user_access_end();



	buf->previous = dirent;

	dirent = (void __user *)dirent + reclen;

	buf->current_dir = dirent;

	buf->count -= reclen;

	return 0;

efault_end:

	user_access_end();

efault:

	buf->error = -EFAULT;

	return -EFAULT;
@@ -259,34 +353,38 @@ static int filldir64(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, 
	int reclen = ALIGN(offsetof(struct linux_dirent64, d_name) + namlen + 1,

		sizeof(u64));



	buf->error = verify_dirent_name(name, namlen);

	if (unlikely(buf->error))

		return buf->error;

	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */

	if (reclen > buf->count)

		return -EINVAL;

	dirent = buf->previous;

	if (dirent) {

		if (signal_pending(current))

	if (dirent && signal_pending(current))

		return -EINTR;

		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))



	/*

	 * Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).

	 * The real range was checked in getdents

	 */

	if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))

		goto efault;

	}

	if (dirent)

		unsafe_put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off, efault_end);

	dirent = buf->current_dir;

	if (__put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(0, &dirent->d_off))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(d_type, &dirent->d_type))

		goto efault;

	if (copy_to_user(dirent->d_name, name, namlen))

		goto efault;

	if (__put_user(0, dirent->d_name + namlen))

		goto efault;

	unsafe_put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino, efault_end);

	unsafe_put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen, efault_end);

	unsafe_put_user(d_type, &dirent->d_type, efault_end);

	unsafe_copy_dirent_name(dirent->d_name, name, namlen, efault_end);

	user_access_end();



	buf->previous = dirent;

	dirent = (void __user *)dirent + reclen;

	buf->current_dir = dirent;

	buf->count -= reclen;

	return 0;

efault_end:

	user_access_end();

efault:

	buf->error = -EFAULT;

	return -EFAULT;

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