Merge tag 'char-misc-5.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc

Embargoed hardware issues

=========================

Scope

-----

Hardware issues which result in security problems are a different category

of security bugs than pure software bugs which  only affect the Linux

kernel.

Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF etc. must be treated

differently because they usually affect all Operating Systems ("OS") and

therefore need coordination across different OS vendors, distributions,

hardware vendors and other parties. For some of the issues, software

mitigations can depend on microcode or firmware updates, which need further

coordination.

.. _Contact:

Contact

-------

The Linux kernel hardware security team is separate from the regular Linux

kernel security team.

The team only handles the coordination of embargoed hardware security

issues.  Reports of pure software security bugs in the Linux kernel are not

handled by this team and the reporter will be guided to contact the regular

Linux kernel security team (:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/

<securitybugs>`) instead.

The team can be contacted by email at <hardware-security@kernel.org>. This

is a private list of security officers who will help you to coordinate an

issue according to our documented process.

The list is encrypted and email to the list can be sent by either PGP or

S/MIME encrypted and must be signed with the reporter's PGP key or S/MIME

certificate. The list's PGP key and S/MIME certificate are available from

https://www.kernel.org/....

While hardware security issues are often handled by the affected hardware

vendor, we welcome contact from researchers or individuals who have

identified a potential hardware flaw.

Hardware security officers

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The current team of hardware security officers:

  - Linus Torvalds (Linux Foundation Fellow)

  - Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux Foundation Fellow)

  - Thomas Gleixner (Linux Foundation Fellow)

Operation of mailing-lists

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The encrypted mailing-lists which are used in our process are hosted on

Linux Foundation's IT infrastructure. By providing this service Linux

Foundation's director of IT Infrastructure security technically has the

ability to access the embargoed information, but is obliged to

confidentiality by his employment contract. Linux Foundation's director of

IT Infrastructure security is also responsible for the kernel.org

infrastructure.

The Linux Foundation's current director of IT Infrastructure security is

Konstantin Ryabitsev.

Non-disclosure agreements

-------------------------

The Linux kernel hardware security team is not a formal body and therefore

unable to enter into any non-disclosure agreements.  The kernel community

is aware of the sensitive nature of such issues and offers a Memorandum of

Understanding instead.

Memorandum of Understanding

---------------------------

The Linux kernel community has a deep understanding of the requirement to

keep hardware security issues under embargo for coordination between

different OS vendors, distributors, hardware vendors and other parties.

The Linux kernel community has successfully handled hardware security

issues in the past and has the necessary mechanisms in place to allow

community compliant development under embargo restrictions.

The Linux kernel community has a dedicated hardware security team for

initial contact, which oversees the process of handling such issues under

embargo rules.

The hardware security team identifies the developers (domain experts) who

will form the initial response team for a particular issue. The initial

response team can bring in further developers (domain experts) to address

the issue in the best technical way.

All involved developers pledge to adhere to the embargo rules and to keep

the received information confidential. Violation of the pledge will lead to

immediate exclusion from the current issue and removal from all related

mailing-lists. In addition, the hardware security team will also exclude

the offender from future issues. The impact of this consequence is a highly

effective deterrent in our community. In case a violation happens the

hardware security team will inform the involved parties immediately. If you

or anyone becomes aware of a potential violation, please report it

immediately to the Hardware security officers.

Process

^^^^^^^

Due to the globally distributed nature of Linux kernel development,

face-to-face meetings are almost impossible to address hardware security

issues.  Phone conferences are hard to coordinate due to time zones and

other factors and should be only used when absolutely necessary. Encrypted

email has been proven to be the most effective and secure communication

method for these types of issues.

Start of Disclosure

"""""""""""""""""""

Disclosure starts by contacting the Linux kernel hardware security team by

email. This initial contact should contain a description of the problem and

a list of any known affected hardware. If your organization builds or

distributes the affected hardware, we encourage you to also consider what

other hardware could be affected.

The hardware security team will provide an incident-specific encrypted

mailing-list which will be used for initial discussion with the reporter,

further disclosure and coordination.

The hardware security team will provide the disclosing party a list of

developers (domain experts) who should be informed initially about the

issue after confirming with the developers  that they will adhere to this

Memorandum of Understanding and the documented process. These developers

form the initial response team and will be responsible for handling the

issue after initial contact. The hardware security team is supporting the

response team, but is not necessarily involved in the mitigation

development process.

While individual developers might be covered by a non-disclosure agreement

via their employer, they cannot enter individual non-disclosure agreements

in their role as Linux kernel developers. They will, however, agree to

adhere to this documented process and the Memorandum of Understanding.

Disclosure

""""""""""

The disclosing party provides detailed information to the initial response

team via the specific encrypted mailing-list.

From our experience the technical documentation of these issues is usually

a sufficient starting point and further technical clarification is best

done via email.

Mitigation development

""""""""""""""""""""""

The initial response team sets up an encrypted mailing-list or repurposes

an existing one if appropriate. The disclosing party should provide a list

of contacts for all other parties who have already been, or should be

informed about the issue. The response team contacts these parties so they

can name experts who should be subscribed to the mailing-list.

Using a mailing-list is close to the normal Linux development process and

has been successfully used in developing mitigations for various hardware

security issues in the past.

The mailing-list operates in the same way as normal Linux development.

Patches are posted, discussed and reviewed and if agreed on applied to a

non-public git repository which is only accessible to the participating

developers via a secure connection. The repository contains the main

development branch against the mainline kernel and backport branches for

stable kernel versions as necessary.

The initial response team will identify further experts from the Linux

kernel developer community as needed and inform the disclosing party about

their participation. Bringing in experts can happen at any time of the

development process and often needs to be handled in a timely manner.

Coordinated release

"""""""""""""""""""

The involved parties will negotiate the date and time where the embargo

ends. At that point the prepared mitigations are integrated into the

relevant kernel trees and published.

While we understand that hardware security issues need coordinated embargo

time, the embargo time should be constrained to the minimum time which is

required for all involved parties to develop, test and prepare the

mitigations. Extending embargo time artificially to meet conference talk

dates or other non-technical reasons is creating more work and burden for

the involved developers and response teams as the patches need to be kept

up to date in order to follow the ongoing upstream kernel development,

which might create conflicting changes.

CVE assignment

""""""""""""""

Neither the hardware security team nor the initial response team assign

CVEs, nor are CVEs required for the development process. If CVEs are

provided by the disclosing party they can be used for documentation

purposes.

Process ambassadors

-------------------

For assistance with this process we have established ambassadors in various

organizations, who can answer questions about or provide guidance on the

reporting process and further handling. Ambassadors are not involved in the

disclosure of a particular issue, unless requested by a response team or by

an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:

  ============= ========================================================

  ARM

  AMD

  IBM

  Intel

  Qualcomm

  Microsoft

  VMware

  XEN

  Canonical	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

  Debian	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

  Oracle	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

  Red Hat	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

  SUSE		Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

  Amazon

  Google

  ============== ========================================================

If you want your organization to be added to the ambassadors list, please

contact the hardware security team. The nominated ambassador has to

understand and support our process fully and is ideally well connected in

the Linux kernel community.

Encrypted mailing-lists

-----------------------

We use encrypted mailing-lists for communication. The operating principle

of these lists is that email sent to the list is encrypted either with the

list's PGP key or with the list's S/MIME certificate. The mailing-list

software decrypts the email and re-encrypts it individually for each

subscriber with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME certificate. Details

about the mailing-list software and the setup which is used to ensure the

security of the lists and protection of the data can be found here:

https://www.kernel.org/....

List keys

^^^^^^^^^

For initial contact see :ref:`Contact`. For incident specific mailing-lists

the key and S/MIME certificate are conveyed to the subscribers by email

sent from the specific list.

Subscription to incident specific lists

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Subscription is handled by the response teams. Disclosed parties who want

to participate in the communication send a list of potential subscribers to

the response team so the response team can validate subscription requests.

Each subscriber needs to send a subscription request to the response team

by email. The email must be signed with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME

certificate. If a PGP key is used, it must be available from a public key

server and is ideally connected to the Linux kernel's PGP web of trust. See

also: https://www.kernel.org/signature.html.

The response team verifies that the subscriber request is valid and adds

the subscriber to the list. After subscription the subscriber will receive

email from the mailing-list which is signed either with the list's PGP key

or the list's S/MIME certificate. The subscriber's email client can extract

the PGP key or the S/MIME certificate from the signature so the subscriber

can send encrypted email to the list.

   submit-checklist

   kernel-docs

   deprecated

   embargoed-hardware-issues

These are some overall technical guides that have been put here for now for

lack of a better place.

F:	include/linux/libnvdimm.h

F:	include/uapi/linux/ndctl.h

LICENSES and SPDX stuff

M:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

M:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

L:	linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org

S:	Maintained

T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx.git

F:	COPYING

F:	Documentation/process/license-rules.rst

F:	LICENSES/

F:	scripts/spdxcheck-test.sh

F:	scripts/spdxcheck.py

LIGHTNVM PLATFORM SUPPORT

M:	Matias Bjorling <mb@lightnvm.io>

W:	http://github/OpenChannelSSD

		return -EIO;

	}

	if (!IS_ERR(conf->confd)) {

	if (conf->confd) {

		if (!gpiod_get_raw_value_cansleep(conf->confd)) {

			dev_err(&mgr->dev, "CONF_DONE is inactive!\n");

			return -EIO;

		return PTR_ERR(conf->status);

	}

	conf->confd = devm_gpiod_get(&spi->dev, "confd", GPIOD_IN);

	conf->confd = devm_gpiod_get_optional(&spi->dev, "confd", GPIOD_IN);

	if (IS_ERR(conf->confd)) {

		dev_warn(&spi->dev, "Not using confd gpio: %ld\n",

		dev_err(&spi->dev, "Failed to get confd gpio: %ld\n",

			PTR_ERR(conf->confd));

		return PTR_ERR(conf->confd);

	} else if (!conf->confd) {

		dev_warn(&spi->dev, "Not using confd gpio");

	}

	/* Register manager with unique name */

#define SCOM_STATUS_PIB_RESP_MASK	0x00007000

#define SCOM_STATUS_PIB_RESP_SHIFT	12

#define SCOM_STATUS_ANY_ERR		(SCOM_STATUS_ERR_SUMMARY | \

					 SCOM_STATUS_PROTECTION | \

#define SCOM_STATUS_ANY_ERR		(SCOM_STATUS_PROTECTION | \

					 SCOM_STATUS_PARITY |	  \

					 SCOM_STATUS_PIB_ABORT | \

					 SCOM_STATUS_PIB_RESP_MASK)

	/* Return -EBUSY on PIB abort to force a retry */

	if (status & SCOM_STATUS_PIB_ABORT)

		return -EBUSY;

	if (status & SCOM_STATUS_ERR_SUMMARY) {

		fsi_device_write(scom->fsi_dev, SCOM_FSI2PIB_RESET_REG, &dummy,

				 sizeof(uint32_t));

		return -EIO;

	}

	return 0;

}