Commit 44f1a7ab authored by Johan Hedberg's avatar Johan Hedberg Committed by Marcel Holtmann
Browse files

Bluetooth: Use L2CAP resume callback to call smp_distribute_keys 



There's no need to export the smp_distribute_keys() function since the
resume callback is called in the same scenario. This patch makes the
smp_notify_keys function private (at the same time moving it higher up
in smp.c to avoid forward declarations) and adds a resume callback for
SMP to call it from there instead.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
parent 89d2975f

net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c

+0 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -7281,12 +7281,6 @@ int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) 


	BT_DBG("conn %p status 0x%2.2x encrypt %u", conn, status, encrypt);



	if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {

		if (!status && encrypt)

			smp_distribute_keys(conn);

		cancel_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer);

	}



	mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);



	list_for_each_entry(chan, &conn->chan_l, list) {

net/bluetooth/smp.c

+196 −184
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -575,6 +575,189 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) 
	return 0;

}



static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)

{

	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;

	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;

	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;

	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;

	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];

	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];

	bool persistent;



	if (smp->remote_irk) {

		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);

		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the

		 * identity address track the connection based on it

		 * from now on.

		 */

		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);

		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;

		l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);



		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for

		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable

		 * private address, just remove the key so that

		 * it is possible to use the controller white

		 * list for scanning.

		 *

		 * Userspace will have been told to not store

		 * this key at this point. So it is safe to

		 * just remove it.

		 */

		if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {

			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);

			kfree(smp->remote_irk);

			smp->remote_irk = NULL;

		}

	}



	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides

	 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.

	 */

	persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);



	if (smp->csrk) {

		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);

	}



	if (smp->slave_csrk) {

		smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);

	}



	if (smp->ltk) {

		smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);

	}



	if (smp->slave_ltk) {

		smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);

	}

}



static int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)

{

	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;

	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;

	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;

	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;

	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;

	__u8 *keydist;



	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);



	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))

		return 0;



	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];



	/* The responder sends its keys first */

	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))

		return 0;



	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];



	if (hcon->out) {

		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;

		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;

	} else {

		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;

		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;

	}



	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);



	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {

		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;

		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;

		struct smp_ltk *ltk;

		u8 authenticated;

		__le16 ediv;

		__le64 rand;



		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));

		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));

		get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);



		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;

		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,

				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,

				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);

		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;



		ident.ediv = ediv;

		ident.rand = rand;



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);



		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;

	}



	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {

		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;

		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;



		memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);



		/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address

		 * after the connection has been established.

		 *

		 * This is true even when the connection has been

		 * established using a resolvable random address.

		 */

		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);

		addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),

			     &addrinfo);



		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;

	}



	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {

		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;

		struct smp_csrk *csrk;



		/* Generate a new random key */

		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));



		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);

		if (csrk) {

			csrk->master = 0x00;

			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));

		}

		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);



		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;

	}



	/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */

	if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))

		return 0;



	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);

	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);

	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);

	smp_notify_keys(conn);



	smp_chan_destroy(conn);



	return 0;

}



static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)

{

	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1294,189 +1477,6 @@ done: 
	return err;

}



static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)

{

	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;

	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;

	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;

	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;

	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];

	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];

	bool persistent;



	if (smp->remote_irk) {

		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);

		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the

		 * identity address track the connection based on it

		 * from now on.

		 */

		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);

		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;

		l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);



		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for

		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable

		 * private address, just remove the key so that

		 * it is possible to use the controller white

		 * list for scanning.

		 *

		 * Userspace will have been told to not store

		 * this key at this point. So it is safe to

		 * just remove it.

		 */

		if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {

			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);

			kfree(smp->remote_irk);

			smp->remote_irk = NULL;

		}

	}



	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides

	 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.

	 */

	persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);



	if (smp->csrk) {

		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);

	}



	if (smp->slave_csrk) {

		smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);

	}



	if (smp->ltk) {

		smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);

	}



	if (smp->slave_ltk) {

		smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;

		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);

		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);

	}

}



int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)

{

	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;

	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;

	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;

	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;

	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;

	__u8 *keydist;



	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);



	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))

		return 0;



	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];



	/* The responder sends its keys first */

	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))

		return 0;



	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];



	if (hcon->out) {

		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;

		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;

	} else {

		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;

		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;

	}



	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);



	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {

		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;

		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;

		struct smp_ltk *ltk;

		u8 authenticated;

		__le16 ediv;

		__le64 rand;



		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));

		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));

		get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);



		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;

		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,

				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,

				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);

		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;



		ident.ediv = ediv;

		ident.rand = rand;



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);



		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;

	}



	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {

		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;

		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;



		memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);



		/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address

		 * after the connection has been established.

		 *

		 * This is true even when the connection has been

		 * established using a resolvable random address.

		 */

		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);

		addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),

			     &addrinfo);



		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;

	}



	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {

		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;

		struct smp_csrk *csrk;



		/* Generate a new random key */

		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));



		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);

		if (csrk) {

			csrk->master = 0x00;

			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));

		}

		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;



		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);



		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;

	}



	/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */

	if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))

		return 0;



	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);

	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);

	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);

	smp_notify_keys(conn);



	smp_chan_destroy(conn);



	return 0;

}



static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)

{

	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1492,6 +1492,18 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) 
	l2cap_chan_put(chan);

}



static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)

{

	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;

	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;



	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);



	if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))

		smp_distribute_keys(conn);

	cancel_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer);

}



static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)

{

	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1524,13 +1536,13 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { 
	.recv			= smp_recv_cb,

	.alloc_skb		= smp_alloc_skb_cb,

	.teardown		= smp_teardown_cb,

	.resume			= smp_resume_cb,



	.new_connection		= l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,

	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,

	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,

	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,

	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,

	.resume			= l2cap_chan_no_resume,

	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,

	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,

	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,

net/bluetooth/smp.h

+0 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ enum { 
/* SMP Commands */

bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level);

int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level);

int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn);

int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);



void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn);

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