[IPSEC]: Use crypto_aead and authenc in ESP (38320c70) · Commits · 戴 / test

include/net/esp.h

+8 −46

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		#ifndef _NET_ESP_H
		#define _NET_ESP_H

		#include <linux/crypto.h>
		#include <net/xfrm.h>
		#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
		#include <linux/skbuff.h>

		#define ESP_NUM_FAST_SG 4
		struct crypto_aead;

		struct esp_data
		{
		struct scatterlist sgbuf[ESP_NUM_FAST_SG];

		/* Confidentiality */
		struct {
		int padlen; /* 0..255 */
		/* ivlen is offset from enc_data, where encrypted data start.
		* It is logically different of crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm).
		* We assume that it is either zero (no ivec), or
		* >= crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm). */
		int ivlen;
		int ivinitted;
		u8 ivec; / ivec buffer */
		struct crypto_blkcipher tfm; / crypto handle */
		} conf;

		/* Integrity. It is active when icv_full_len != 0 */
		struct {
		u8 *work_icv;
		int icv_full_len;
		int icv_trunc_len;
		struct crypto_hash *tfm;
		} auth;
		struct esp_data {
		/* 0..255 */
		int padlen;

		/* Confidentiality & Integrity */
		struct crypto_aead *aead;
		};

		extern void pskb_put(struct sk_buff skb, struct sk_buff *tail, int len);

		static inline int esp_mac_digest(struct esp_data esp, struct sk_buff skb,
		int offset, int len)
		{
		struct hash_desc desc;
		int err;

		desc.tfm = esp->auth.tfm;
		desc.flags = 0;

		err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
		if (unlikely(err))
		return err;
		err = skb_icv_walk(skb, &desc, offset, len, crypto_hash_update);
		if (unlikely(err))
		return err;
		return crypto_hash_final(&desc, esp->auth.work_icv);
		}

		struct ip_esp_hdr;

		static inline struct ip_esp_hdr ip_esp_hdr(const struct sk_buff skb)

net/ipv4/Kconfig

+1 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ config INET_ESP
		tristate "IP: ESP transformation"
		select XFRM
		select CRYPTO
		select CRYPTO_AEAD
		select CRYPTO_HMAC
		select CRYPTO_MD5
		select CRYPTO_CBC

net/ipv4/esp4.c

+302 −195

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		#include <crypto/aead.h>
		#include <crypto/authenc.h>
		#include <linux/err.h>
		#include <linux/module.h>
		#include <net/ip.h>
		#include <net/xfrm.h>
		#include <net/esp.h>
		#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
		#include <linux/crypto.h>
		#include <linux/kernel.h>
		#include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
		#include <linux/random.h>
		#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
		#include <linux/slab.h>
		#include <linux/spinlock.h>
		#include <linux/in6.h>
		#include <net/icmp.h>
		#include <net/protocol.h>
		#include <net/udp.h>

		struct esp_skb_cb {
		struct xfrm_skb_cb xfrm;
		void *tmp;
		};

		#define ESP_SKB_CB(__skb) ((struct esp_skb_cb *)&((__skb)->cb[0]))

		/*
		* Allocate an AEAD request structure with extra space for SG and IV.
		*
		* For alignment considerations the IV is placed at the front, followed
		* by the request and finally the SG list.
		*
		* TODO: Use spare space in skb for this where possible.
		*/
		static void esp_alloc_tmp(struct crypto_aead aead, int nfrags)
		{
		unsigned int len;

		len = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
		if (len) {
		len += crypto_aead_alignmask(aead) &
		~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
		len = ALIGN(len, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
		}

		len += sizeof(struct aead_givcrypt_request) + crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
		len = ALIGN(len, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));

		len += sizeof(struct scatterlist) * nfrags;

		return kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
		}

		static inline u8 esp_tmp_iv(struct crypto_aead aead, void *tmp)
		{
		return crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) ?
		PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)tmp, crypto_aead_alignmask(aead) + 1) : tmp;
		}

		static inline struct aead_givcrypt_request *esp_tmp_givreq(
		struct crypto_aead aead, u8 iv)
		{
		struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;

		req = (void *)PTR_ALIGN(iv + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead),
		crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
		aead_givcrypt_set_tfm(req, aead);
		return req;
		}

		static inline struct aead_request esp_tmp_req(struct crypto_aead aead, u8 *iv)
		{
		struct aead_request *req;

		req = (void *)PTR_ALIGN(iv + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead),
		crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
		aead_request_set_tfm(req, aead);
		return req;
		}

		static inline struct scatterlist esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead aead,
		struct aead_request *req)
		{
		return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
		crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
		__alignof__(struct scatterlist));
		}

		static inline struct scatterlist *esp_givreq_sg(
		struct crypto_aead aead, struct aead_givcrypt_request req)
		{
		return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
		crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
		__alignof__(struct scatterlist));
		}

		static void esp_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
		{
		struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;

		kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
		xfrm_output_resume(skb, err);
		}

		static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state x, struct sk_buff skb)
		{
		int err;
		struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
		struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
		struct blkcipher_desc desc;
		struct crypto_aead *aead;
		struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;
		struct scatterlist *sg;
		struct scatterlist *asg;
		struct esp_data *esp;
		struct sk_buff *trailer;
		void *tmp;
		u8 *iv;
		u8 *tail;
		int blksize;
		int clen;
		@@ -36,18 +127,27 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state x, struct sk_buff skb)
		clen = skb->len;

		esp = x->data;
		alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
		tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
		desc.tfm = tfm;
		desc.flags = 0;
		blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
		aead = esp->aead;
		alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);

		blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
		clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
		if (esp->conf.padlen)
		clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
		if (esp->padlen)
		clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->padlen);

		if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
		if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, clen - skb->len + alen, &trailer)) < 0)
		goto error;
		nfrags = err;

		tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
		if (!tmp)
		goto error;

		iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
		req = esp_tmp_givreq(aead, iv);
		asg = esp_givreq_sg(aead, req);
		sg = asg + 1;

		/* Fill padding... */
		tail = skb_tail_pointer(trailer);
		do {
		@@ -56,28 +156,34 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state x, struct sk_buff skb)
		tail[i] = i + 1;
		} while (0);
		tail[clen - skb->len - 2] = (clen - skb->len) - 2;
		pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
		tail[clen - skb->len - 1] = *skb_mac_header(skb);
		pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len + alen);

		skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(skb));
		esph = ip_esp_hdr(skb);
		(skb_tail_pointer(trailer) - 1) = skb_mac_header(skb);
		*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_ESP;

		spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);

		/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
		if (x->encap) {
		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
		struct udphdr *uh;
		__be32 *udpdata32;
		unsigned int sport, dport;
		int encap_type;

		spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
		sport = encap->encap_sport;
		dport = encap->encap_dport;
		encap_type = encap->encap_type;
		spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);

		uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
		uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
		uh->dest = encap->encap_dport;
		uh->len = htons(skb->len + alen - skb_transport_offset(skb));
		uh->source = sport;
		uh->dest = dport;
		uh->len = htons(skb->len - skb_transport_offset(skb));
		uh->check = 0;

		switch (encap->encap_type) {
		switch (encap_type) {
		default:
		case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
		esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
		@@ -95,131 +201,45 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state x, struct sk_buff skb)
		esph->spi = x->id.spi;
		esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);

		if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
		if (unlikely(!esp->conf.ivinitted)) {
		get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
		esp->conf.ivinitted = 1;
		}
		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
		}

		do {
		struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];

		if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
		sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
		if (!sg)
		goto unlock;
		}
		sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
		skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
		esph->enc_data +
		esp->conf.ivlen -
		skb->data, clen);
		err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg, sg, clen);
		if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
		kfree(sg);
		} while (0);

		if (unlikely(err))
		goto unlock;

		if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
		memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
		crypto_blkcipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
		}
		esph->enc_data + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) - skb->data,
		clen + alen);
		sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));

		aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
		aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
		aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
		aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data, XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);

		ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
		err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
		if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
		goto error;

		if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
		err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, (u8 *)esph - skb->data,
		sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen + clen);
		memcpy(pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen), esp->auth.work_icv, alen);
		}
		if (err == -EBUSY)
		err = NET_XMIT_DROP;

		unlock:
		spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
		kfree(tmp);

		error:
		return err;
		}

		/*
		* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
		* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
		* and common case.
		*/
		static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state x, struct sk_buff skb)
		static int esp_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
		{
		struct iphdr *iph;
		struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
		struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
		struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
		struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
		struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm };
		struct sk_buff *trailer;
		int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
		int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
		int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
		int nfrags;
		struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
		int alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
		int hlen = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
		int elen = skb->len - hlen;
		int ihl;
		u8 nexthdr[2];
		struct scatterlist *sg;
		int padlen;
		int err = -EINVAL;

		if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph)))
		goto out;

		if (elen <= 0 \|\| (elen & (blksize-1)))
		goto out;

		if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
		goto out;
		nfrags = err;

		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;

		spin_lock(&x->lock);

		/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
		if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
		u8 sum[alen];

		err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, 0, skb->len - alen);
		if (err)
		goto unlock;

		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen, sum, alen))
		BUG();

		if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
		err = -EBADMSG;
		goto unlock;
		}
		}

		esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;

		/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
		if (esp->conf.ivlen)
		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivlen);

		sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];

		if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
		err = -ENOMEM;
		sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
		if (!sg)
		goto unlock;
		}
		sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
		skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
		sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen,
		elen);
		err = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg, sg, elen);
		if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
		kfree(sg);

		unlock:
		spin_unlock(&x->lock);
		kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);

		if (unlikely(err))
		goto out;
		@@ -229,15 +249,11 @@ unlock:

		err = -EINVAL;
		padlen = nexthdr[0];
		if (padlen+2 >= elen)
		if (padlen + 2 + alen >= elen)
		goto out;

		/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */

		/* RFC4303: Drop dummy packets without any error */
		if (nexthdr[1] == IPPROTO_NONE)
		goto out;

		iph = ip_hdr(skb);
		ihl = iph->ihl * 4;

		@@ -279,10 +295,87 @@ unlock:
		}

		pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
		__skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen);
		__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
		skb_set_transport_header(skb, -ihl);

		return nexthdr[1];
		err = nexthdr[1];

		/* RFC4303: Drop dummy packets without any error */
		if (err == IPPROTO_NONE)
		err = -EINVAL;

		out:
		return err;
		}

		static void esp_input_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
		{
		struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;

		xfrm_input_resume(skb, esp_input_done2(skb, err));
		}

		/*
		* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
		* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
		* and common case.
		*/
		static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state x, struct sk_buff skb)
		{
		struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
		struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
		struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
		struct aead_request *req;
		struct sk_buff *trailer;
		int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
		int nfrags;
		void *tmp;
		u8 *iv;
		struct scatterlist *sg;
		struct scatterlist *asg;
		int err = -EINVAL;

		if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph)))
		goto out;

		if (elen <= 0)
		goto out;

		if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
		goto out;
		nfrags = err;

		err = -ENOMEM;
		tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
		if (!tmp)
		goto out;

		ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
		iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
		req = esp_tmp_req(aead, iv);
		asg = esp_req_sg(aead, req);
		sg = asg + 1;

		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;

		esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;

		/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
		iv = esph->enc_data;

		sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
		skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead), elen);
		sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));

		aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, esp_input_done, skb);
		aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen, iv);
		aead_request_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));

		err = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
		if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
		goto out;

		err = esp_input_done2(skb, err);

		out:
		return err;
		@@ -291,11 +384,11 @@ out:
		static u32 esp4_get_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
		{
		struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
		u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
		u32 align = max_t(u32, blksize, esp->conf.padlen);
		u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(esp->aead), 4);
		u32 align = max_t(u32, blksize, esp->padlen);
		u32 rem;

		mtu -= x->props.header_len + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
		mtu -= x->props.header_len + crypto_aead_authsize(esp->aead);
		rem = mtu & (align - 1);
		mtu &= ~(align - 1);

		@@ -342,80 +435,98 @@ static void esp_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
		if (!esp)
		return;

		crypto_free_blkcipher(esp->conf.tfm);
		esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
		kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
		esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
		crypto_free_hash(esp->auth.tfm);
		esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
		kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
		esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
		crypto_free_aead(esp->aead);
		kfree(esp);
		}

		static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
		{
		struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
		struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
		struct crypto_aead *aead;
		struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
		struct rtattr *rta;
		char *key;
		char *p;
		char authenc_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
		u32 align;
		unsigned int keylen;
		int err;

		if (x->ealg == NULL)
		goto error;
		return -EINVAL;

		if (snprintf(authenc_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "authenc(%s,%s)",
		x->aalg ? x->aalg->alg_name : "digest_null",
		x->ealg->alg_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
		return -ENAMETOOLONG;

		esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
		if (esp == NULL)
		return -ENOMEM;

		if (x->aalg) {
		struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
		struct crypto_hash *hash;
		x->data = esp;

		hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
		CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
		if (IS_ERR(hash))
		aead = crypto_alloc_aead(authenc_name, 0, 0);
		err = PTR_ERR(aead);
		if (IS_ERR(aead))
		goto error;

		esp->auth.tfm = hash;
		if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, x->aalg->alg_key,
		(x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
		esp->aead = aead;

		keylen = (x->aalg ? (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8 : 0) +
		(x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8 + RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
		err = -ENOMEM;
		key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!key)
		goto error;

		p = key;
		rta = (void *)p;
		rta->rta_type = CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM;
		rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(*param));
		param = RTA_DATA(rta);
		p += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));

		if (x->aalg) {
		struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;

		memcpy(p, x->aalg->alg_key, (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
		p += (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8;

		aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
		BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);

		err = -EINVAL;
		if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
		crypto_hash_digestsize(hash)) {
		crypto_aead_authsize(aead)) {
		NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
		x->aalg->alg_name,
		crypto_hash_digestsize(hash),
		crypto_aead_authsize(aead),
		aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
		goto error;
		goto free_key;
		}

		esp->auth.icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
		esp->auth.icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;

		esp->auth.work_icv = kmalloc(esp->auth.icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
		goto error;
		err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(
		aead, aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits / 8);
		if (err)
		goto free_key;
		}

		tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
		if (IS_ERR(tfm))
		goto error;
		esp->conf.tfm = tfm;
		esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
		esp->conf.padlen = 0;
		if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
		esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
		goto error;
		esp->conf.ivinitted = 0;
		}
		if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, x->ealg->alg_key,
		(x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
		esp->padlen = 0;

		param->enckeylen = cpu_to_be32((x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
		memcpy(p, x->ealg->alg_key, (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);

		err = crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, keylen);

		free_key:
		kfree(key);

		if (err)
		goto error;
		x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;

		x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) +
		crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
		if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
		x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
		else if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET)
		@@ -434,18 +545,14 @@ static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
		break;
		}
		}
		x->data = esp;
		align = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
		if (esp->conf.padlen)
		align = max_t(u32, align, esp->conf.padlen);
		x->props.trailer_len = align + 1 + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
		return 0;

		align = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
		if (esp->padlen)
		align = max_t(u32, align, esp->padlen);
		x->props.trailer_len = align + 1 + crypto_aead_authsize(esp->aead);

		error:
		x->data = esp;
		esp_destroy(x);
		x->data = NULL;
		return -EINVAL;
		return err;
		}

		static struct xfrm_type esp_type =

net/ipv6/Kconfig

+1 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ config INET6_ESP
		depends on IPV6
		select XFRM
		select CRYPTO
		select CRYPTO_AEAD
		select CRYPTO_HMAC
		select CRYPTO_MD5
		select CRYPTO_CBC

net/ipv6/esp6.c

+279 −181

File changed.

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