Commit 1186b623 authored by John W. Linville's avatar John W. Linville
Browse files

Merge branch 'for-upstream' of... 

Merge branch 'for-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth-next
parents 6bd2bd27 9a783a13

net/bluetooth/hci_core.c

+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -3872,6 +3872,7 @@ static void set_random_addr(struct hci_request *req, bdaddr_t *rpa) 
	if (test_bit(HCI_LE_ADV, &hdev->dev_flags) ||

	    hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, LE_LINK, BT_CONNECT)) {

		BT_DBG("Deferring random address update");

		set_bit(HCI_RPA_EXPIRED, &hdev->dev_flags);

		return;

	}

net/bluetooth/hci_event.c

+7 −4
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2438,6 +2438,12 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) 
		}

	}



	/* We should disregard the current RPA and generate a new one

	 * whenever the encryption procedure fails.

	 */

	if (ev->status && conn->type == LE_LINK)

		set_bit(HCI_RPA_EXPIRED, &hdev->dev_flags);



	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);



	if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
@@ -4506,10 +4512,7 @@ static void hci_le_ltk_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk->val, sizeof(ltk->val));

	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);



	if (ltk->authenticated)

		conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;

	else

		conn->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;

	conn->pending_sec_level = smp_ltk_sec_level(ltk);



	conn->enc_key_size = ltk->enc_size;

net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c

+33 −20
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1283,25 +1283,13 @@ static void l2cap_start_connection(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 
	}

}



static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan)

static void l2cap_request_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn)

{

	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;



	if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) {

		l2cap_le_start(chan);

		return;

	}

	struct l2cap_info_req req;



	if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT) {

		if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE))

	if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)

		return;



		if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) &&

		    __l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {

			l2cap_start_connection(chan);

		}

	} else {

		struct l2cap_info_req req;

	req.type = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK);



	conn->info_state |= L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT;
@@ -1312,6 +1300,27 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 
	l2cap_send_cmd(conn, conn->info_ident, L2CAP_INFO_REQ,

		       sizeof(req), &req);

}



static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan)

{

	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;



	if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) {

		l2cap_le_start(chan);

		return;

	}



	if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)) {

		l2cap_request_info(conn);

		return;

	}



	if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE))

		return;



	if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) &&

	    __l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan))

		l2cap_start_connection(chan);

}



static inline int l2cap_mode_supported(__u8 mode, __u32 feat_mask)
@@ -1370,6 +1379,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 
		l2cap_chan_lock(chan);



		if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED) {

			l2cap_chan_ready(chan);

			l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);

			continue;

		}
@@ -1474,6 +1484,9 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 


	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);



	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK)

		l2cap_request_info(conn);



	mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);



	list_for_each_entry(chan, &conn->chan_l, list) {
@@ -1488,8 +1501,8 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 
		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {

			l2cap_le_start(chan);

		} else if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED) {

			if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE)

				l2cap_chan_ready(chan);



		} else if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) {

			l2cap_do_start(chan);

		}

net/bluetooth/smp.c

+26 −31
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ 
#include "smp.h"



#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)

#define SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)



#define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
@@ -949,20 +948,22 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (!smp)

		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;



	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */

	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;



	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&

	    (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))

	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))

		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);



	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;

	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));

	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));



	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */

	auth = req->auth_req;



	if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)

		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;

	else

		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);



	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)

		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
@@ -1003,7 +1004,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;

	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;

	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;

	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;

	u8 key_size, auth;

	int ret;



	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -1014,8 +1015,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)

		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);



	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));



	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
@@ -1024,6 +1023,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))

		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;



	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;



	/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */

	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {

		u8 method;
@@ -1044,11 +1045,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	 */

	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;



	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&

	    (rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))

		auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;



	auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;

	auth |= req->auth_req;



	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);

	if (ret)
@@ -1073,8 +1070,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))

		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);



	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));

	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
@@ -1103,8 +1098,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))

		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);



	memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));

	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
@@ -1121,7 +1114,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) 
	if (!key)

		return false;



	if (sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM && !key->authenticated)

	if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)

		return false;



	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
@@ -1164,7 +1157,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;

	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;

	struct smp_chan *smp;

	u8 sec_level;

	u8 sec_level, auth;



	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -1174,7 +1167,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)

		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;



	sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);

	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;



	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)

		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;

	else

		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);



	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))

		return 0;
@@ -1189,13 +1188,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;



	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&

	    (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))

	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))

		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;



	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));



	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));

	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);

	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);



	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;

	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
@@ -1293,7 +1292,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))

		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);

	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);



	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@@ -1321,9 +1319,10 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	/* Mark the information as received */

	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);

	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)

		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);

	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)

		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);



	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@@ -1351,7 +1350,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))

		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);

	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);



	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
@@ -1378,7 +1376,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 
	/* Mark the information as received */

	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);

	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)

		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
@@ -1434,8 +1431,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	/* Mark the information as received */

	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;



	SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);



	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));



	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
@@ -1480,7 +1475,7 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) 
	if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)

		goto drop;



	if (smp && !test_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))

	if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))

		goto drop;



	/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are

net/bluetooth/smp.h

+8 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -125,6 +125,14 @@ enum { 
	SMP_LTK_SLAVE,

};



static inline u8 smp_ltk_sec_level(struct smp_ltk *key)

{

	if (key->authenticated)

		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;



	return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;

}



/* SMP Commands */

bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level);

int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level);

CRA Git | Maintained and supported by SUSTech CRA and CCSE