ext/lib/crypto: Update TinyCrypt to version 0.2.6 (c6588695) · Commits · Wenxi XU / zephyr

ext/lib/crypto/tinycrypt/include/tinycrypt/constants.h

+0 −4

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ extern "C" {
		#define NULL ((void *)0)
		#endif

		#ifndef bool
		enum {false, true} bool;
		#endif

		#define TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS 1
		#define TC_CRYPTO_FAIL 0

ext/lib/crypto/tinycrypt/include/tinycrypt/ecc.h

+39 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -79,10 +79,12 @@
		extern "C" {
		#endif

		/* Word size (4 bytes considering 32-bits architectures) */
		#define WORD_SIZE 4
		/* Number of words of 32 bits to represent an element of the the curve p-256: */
		#define NUM_ECC_DIGITS 8
		/* Number of bytes to represent an element of the the curve p-256: */
		#define NUM_ECC_BYTES (4*NUM_ECC_DIGITS)
		#define NUM_ECC_BYTES (WORD_SIZE*NUM_ECC_DIGITS)

		/* struct to represent a point of the curve (uses X and Y coordinates): */
		typedef struct EccPoint {
		@@ -218,6 +220,8 @@ void vli_modSquare_fast(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_left);
		* @param p_right IN -- buffer p_right in (p_left * p_right) % p_mod.
		* @param p_mod IN -- module.
		* @param p_barrett IN -- used for Barrett reduction.
		* @note Side-channel countermeasure: algorithm strengthened against timing
		* attack.
		*/
		void vli_modMult(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_left, uint32_t *p_right,
		uint32_t p_mod, uint32_t p_barrett);
		@@ -229,10 +233,27 @@ void vli_modMult(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_left, uint32_t *p_right,
		* @param p_input IN -- buffer p_input in (1/p_intput) % p_mod.
		* @param p_mod IN -- module.
		* @param p_barrett IN -- used for Barrett reduction.
		* @note Side-channel countermeasure: algorithm strengthened against timing
		* attack.
		*/
		void vli_modInv(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_input,
		uint32_t p_mod, uint32_t p_barrett);

		/*
		* @brief modular reduction based on Barrett's method
		* @param p_result OUT -- p_product % p_mod.
		* @param p_product IN -- buffer p_product in (p_product % p_mod).
		* @param p_mod IN -- buffer p_mod in (p_product % p_mod).
		* @param p_barrett -- used for Barrett reduction.
		* @note Side-channel countermeasure: algorithm strengthened against timing
		* attack.
		*/
		void vli_mmod_barrett(
		uint32_t *p_result,
		uint32_t *p_product,
		uint32_t *p_mod,
		uint32_t *p_barrett);

		/*
		* @brief Check if a point is zero.
		* @return Returns 1 if p_point is the point at infinity, 0 otherwise.
		@@ -271,8 +292,24 @@ void EccPoint_add(EccPointJacobi P1, EccPointJacobi P2);
		* @param p_result OUT -- Product of p_point by p_scalar.
		* @param p_point IN -- Elliptic curve point
		* @param p_scalar IN -- Scalar integer
		* @note Side-channel countermeasure: algorithm strengthened against timing
		* attack.
		*/
		void EccPoint_mult_safe(EccPointJacobi p_result, EccPoint p_point,
		uint32_t *p_scalar);

		/*
		* @brief Fast elliptic curve scalar multiplication with result in Jacobi
		* coordinates
		* @note non constant time
		* @param p_result OUT -- Product of p_point by p_scalar.
		* @param p_point IN -- Elliptic curve point
		* @param p_scalar IN -- Scalar integer
		* @note algorithm NOT strengthened against timing attack.
		*/
		void EccPoint_mult(EccPointJacobi p_result, EccPoint p_point,
		void EccPoint_mult_unsafe(
		EccPointJacobi *p_result,
		EccPoint *p_point,
		uint32_t *p_scalar);

		/*

ext/lib/crypto/tinycrypt/include/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.h

+10 −10

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ extern "C" {

		/**
		* @brief Create a public/private key pair.
		* @return returns TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS (1) if the key pair was generated successfully
		* @return returns TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS (1) if key pair was generated successfully
		* returns TC_CRYPTO_FAIL (0) if:
		* the private key is 0
		*
		@@ -90,13 +90,15 @@ extern "C" {
		*
		* @note You must use a new non-predictable random number to generate each
		* new key pair.
		* @note p_random must have NUM_ECC_DIGITS*2 bits of entropy to eliminate
		* bias in keys.
		*
		* @note side-channel countermeasure: algorithm strengthened against timing
		* attack.
		*/
		int32_t ecc_make_key(EccPoint *p_publicKey,
		uint32_t p_privateKey[NUM_ECC_DIGITS],
		uint32_t p_random[NUM_ECC_DIGITS]);
		uint32_t p_random[2 * NUM_ECC_DIGITS]);

		/**
		* @brief Determine whether or not a given point is on the chosen elliptic curve
		@@ -106,7 +108,8 @@ int32_t ecc_make_key(EccPoint *p_publicKey,
		* returns -2 if: curve_p - p_publicKey->x != 1 or
		* curve_p - p_publicKey->y != 1
		* returns -3 if: y^2 != x^3 + ax + b

		* returns -4 if: public key is the group generator
		*
		* @param p_publicKey IN -- The point to be checked.
		*/
		int32_t ecc_valid_public_key(EccPoint *p_publicKey);
		@@ -114,7 +117,7 @@ int32_t ecc_valid_public_key(EccPoint *p_publicKey);
		/**
		* @brief Compute a shared secret given your secret key and someone else's
		* public key.
		* @return returns TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS (1) if the shared secret was computed successfully
		* @return returns TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS (1) if the secret was computed successfully
		* returns TC_CRYPTO_FAIL (0) otherwise
		*
		* @param p_secret OUT -- The shared secret value.
		@@ -125,12 +128,9 @@ int32_t ecc_valid_public_key(EccPoint *p_publicKey);
		* attacks. The random multiplier should probably be different for each
		* invocation of ecdh_shared_secret().
		*
		* @note It is recommended that you hash the result of ecdh_shared_secret before
		* using it for symmetric encryption or HMAC. If you do not hash the shared
		* secret, you must call ecc_valid_public_key() to verify that the remote side's
		* public key is valid. If this is not done, an attacker could create a public
		* key that would cause your use of the shared secret to leak information about
		* the private key.
		* @warning It is recommended to use the output of ecdh_shared_secret() as the
		* input of a recommended Key Derivation Function (see NIST SP 800-108) in
		* order to produce a symmetric key.
		*/
		int32_t ecdh_shared_secret(uint32_t p_secret[NUM_ECC_DIGITS], EccPoint *p_publicKey,
		uint32_t p_privateKey[NUM_ECC_DIGITS]);

ext/lib/crypto/tinycrypt/include/tinycrypt/hmac.h

+1 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ int32_t tc_hmac_update(TCHmacState_t ctx,
		* ctx == NULL or
		* key == NULL or
		* taglen != TC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
		* @note 'ctx' is erased before exiting (this must never be changed/removed).
		* @note Assumes the tag bufer is at least sizeof(hmac_tag_size(state)) bytes
		* state has been initialized by tc_hmac_init
		* @param tag IN/OUT -- buffer to receive computed HMAC tag

ext/lib/crypto/tinycrypt/source/ecc.c

+24 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static void vli_clear(uint32_t *p_vli)
		}
		}

		/* Returns nonzero if bit p_bit of p_vli is set. */
		/* Returns nonzero if bit p_bit of p_vli is set.
		* It is assumed that the value provided in 'bit' is within
		* the boundaries of the word-array 'p_vli'.*/
		static uint32_t vli_testBit(uint32_t *p_vli, uint32_t p_bit)
		{
		return (p_vli[p_bit / 32] & (1 << (p_bit % 32)));
		@@ -235,7 +237,7 @@ static void vli_square(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_left)
		}

		/* Computes p_result = p_product % curve_p using Barrett reduction. */
		static void vli_mmod_barrett(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_product,
		void vli_mmod_barrett(uint32_t p_result, uint32_t p_product,
		uint32_t p_mod, uint32_t p_barrett)
		{
		uint32_t i;
		@@ -547,7 +549,7 @@ void EccPoint_add(EccPointJacobi P1, EccPointJacobi P2)
		*
		* p_result = p_scalar * p_point.
		*/
		void EccPoint_mult(EccPointJacobi p_result, EccPoint p_point, uint32_t *p_scalar)
		void EccPoint_mult_safe(EccPointJacobi p_result, EccPoint p_point, uint32_t *p_scalar)
		{

		int32_t i;
		@@ -568,6 +570,25 @@ void EccPoint_mult(EccPointJacobi p_result, EccPoint p_point, uint32_t *p_scal
		}
		}

		/* Ellptic curve scalar multiplication with result in Jacobi coordinates */
		/* p_result = p_scalar * p_point */
		void EccPoint_mult_unsafe(EccPointJacobi p_result, EccPoint p_point, uint32_t *p_scalar)
		{
		int i;
		EccPointJacobi p_point_jacobi;
		EccPoint_fromAffine(p_result, p_point);
		EccPoint_fromAffine(&p_point_jacobi, p_point);

		for(i = vli_numBits(p_scalar) - 2; i >= 0; i--)
		{
		EccPoint_double(p_result);
		if (vli_testBit(p_scalar, i))
		{
		EccPoint_add(p_result, &p_point_jacobi);
		}
		}
		}

		/* -------- Conversions between big endian and little endian: -------- */

		void ecc_bytes2native(uint32_t p_native[NUM_ECC_DIGITS],

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